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I. INTRODUCTION
The diversification of American society has increased the
prospect that an individual will suffer discrimination at the
hands of government on the basis of religion. Our polity
arguably has matured to the point where official discrimination
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is less likely to be inflicted through intentional wrongdoing.'
On the other hand, the mushrooming of the number and
variety of religious faiths has increased the probability that a
secular law, meant to apply to the entire citizenry in a non-
discriminatory fashion, will conflict with the religious practices
of adherents of non-mainstream faiths whose beliefs and
practices were unknown to the legislators.
Odd as it may seem for a nation founded in part upon the
desire to be unleashed from the shackles of conformity to a
single religion, the struggle for legal protection of religious
liberty of minority faiths persists as we enter the new
millennium. Ironically, the greatest threat to the ability of
members of non-mainstream religions to adhere to their tenets
arose in the past decade as a result of two decisions of the
United States Supreme Court-Employment Division v. Smith2
and City of Boerne v. Flores.3  Federal statutes designed to
countermand the dilution of religious freedom triggered by
these decisions continue to be floated, but even if passed, they
face serious constitutional hurdles. The very constitutional
obstacles to these federal proposals, however, afford
affirmative support for state religious freedom non-restoration
acts that maximize the ability of all individuals to be faithful to
their religion.
II. THE DWINDLING PROTECTION OF MINORITY RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Ten years ago, there was no cause to look beyond the United
States Constitution to secure religious liberty for worshipers of
minority faiths. As of 1990, the United States Supreme Court
had consistently interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment4 to afford maximum protection of all
1. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993)
("The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief
or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our
opinions."); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurrng) ("[Flew states would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting
or burdening religious practice[s] as such.").
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4. U.S. CONST. amend I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ") In Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940), the Court held the rights guaranteed by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to be fundamental and thus
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individuals whose religion was compromised by requirements
of generally applicable laws. The Court solidly endorsed a
strict scrutiny test to gauge the constitutionality of legislative or
other governmental measures that had the purpose or effect of
invading the free exercise of religion.' The Court's test
demanded that the person claiming a constitutional
deprivation first prove that she had a sincerely-held religious
belief that the government had infringed. In assessing whether
the plaintiff had satisfied her burden, the Court was quite
solicitous of minority religious precepts. The Court refused to
inquire into the centrality of the belief to the individual's
religion or the validity of the individual's interpretation of that
belief.6 The plaintiff was not required to establish that her
dogmas were consistent, logical or acceptable to others.! To the
contrary, the courts were instructed to accept a belief as
religious even where the article of faith was not shared by all
members of the sect or was even "rank heresy to followers of
the orthodox faiths."8
While deferential to the individual's claimed religious belief,
the Court was quite rigorous in evaluating the government's
contention that the demands of civil society trump the
individual's religious obligation. To sustain the burden on the
religious exercise, the government had to prove both that a) it
had a compelling governmental interest, and b) the
government's compelling interest could not be satisfied by
means less restrictive of the individual's religious beliefs.9 The
test applied even if the government in good faith enacted a
general law that unintentionally and unknowingly impinged
upon the practice of an individual's faith.
applicable to the states as part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
5. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
6. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
7. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
8. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); see also Thomas v. Review lid.
of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
9. See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 689; Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835; Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comr'n, 480 U.S. 136,141 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
257-58 (1982); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
406-07.
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A. Abrogating Strict Scrutiny for Unintended Invasions of Religious
Liberty-The Court's Smith Decision
In 1990, however, the United States Supreme Court
diminished the safeguards afforded to non-mainstream faiths
by the Free Exercise Clause in its 5-4 opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith."0  Smith arose out of the denial of
unemployment benefits to two members of the Native
American Church, who were fired from their jobs at a drug
rehabilitation facility because they had ingested peyote during
a church ceremony. Oregon law criminalized possession of
peyote as a controlled substance and contained no exception
for use of peyote for sacramental purposes. Finding that
plaintiffs had been fired for work-related misconduct, the
Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human
Resources ruled plaintiffs ineligible for unemployment
compensation. Plaintiffs challenged the ruling, arguing that
the Constitution precluded the government from conditioning
public benefits on the sacrifice of religious practices."
The Supreme Court refused to apply the compelling
interest/no less restrictive alternatives test to the plaintiffs'
Free Exercise claim. The Court held that, in ordinary
circumstances, it would sustain a neutral and generally
applicable law that had the effect of burdening an individual's
religious beliefs as long as the government had a rational basis
for passing the law. Courts were now to apply strict scrutiny
to governmental measures that invaded religion only in three
limited circumstances. First, the government must continue to
satisfy the compelling interest/no less restrictive alternatives
test in the rare instances in which it passed a law whose object
"is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation." 2 Secondly, courts would utilize the
heightened standard of review for what the Court termed
"hybrid" violations - governmental action that violated not
only religious liberty but in addition trammeled upon a second
fundamental right, such as freedom of speech.'3 Finally, the
10. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11. See id. at 874-76.
12. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); see
also Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
13. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. In Smith, the Court described hybrid rights as
claims involving free exercise "in conjunction with or "connected with" other
No. 2]
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Court maintained strict scrutiny for government programs that
have a protocol for affording exemptions from a law of general
applicability but that deny an exemption to a religious
objector.' 4
Mainstream religions will not likely suffer the erosion of
religious liberty precipitated by Smith because they have the
political clout to ensure that no majoritarian legislation is
passed that inadvertently offends their religious tenets.
Minority faiths, however, are easily victimized by uniform laws
promulgated either in ignorance of, or indifference to, the fact
that the laws burden their religious prescriptions. 5 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority in Smith, accepted this inequity
as an inevitable by-product of the Court's approach to Free
provisions of the Constitution. Id. 494 U.S. at 881. In Boerne, the Court described
hybrid cases as ones that "implicated" rights beyond free exercise. City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,514 (1997). Absent more particularized guidance, the lower
federal courts have taken divergent approaches to gauge whether a hybrid rights
situation is presented meriting application of the compelling interest/no less
restrictive alternatives test. Some courts have interpreted Smith to mandate the
actual existence of an "independently viable" right other than free exercise before
strict scrutiny will be applied. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83
F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525,
539 (1st Cir. 1995). On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit does not require proof of
a companion right; it merely demands a "colorable" claim of infringement of a
right other than free exercise. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135
F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit, finding the hybrid rights
exception "completely illogical," has elected to apply the deferential Smith
standard to all generally applicable laws and regulations. See Kissinger v. Board
of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[U]ntil the
Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary
depending on whether other constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a
stricter legal standard than that used in Smith to evaluate a generally applicable,
exceptionless state regulation under the Free Exercise Clause.').
14. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84; see also Fraternal Order of Police Newark
Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying heightened
scrutiny to police department's refusal to exempt Sunni Muslim officers from
policy prohibiting wearing of beards where exemptions were made for medical
reasons).
The lower courts have refused to limit application of the reduced level of
scrutiny to requests for exemption from criminal laws. See Miller v. Reed, 176
F.3d 1202,1207 (9th Cir. 1999); Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 363.
15. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,152 n.4 (1938); see also
Timothy L. Hall, Omnibus Protections of Religious Liberty and the Establishment
Clause, 21 CARDOzO L. REv. 539 (1999):
Especially when a religious belief is held by a small minority of
individuals, legislators may simply be unaware of the crisis of religious
conscience a neutral law may occasion. Moreover, indifference is not the
only attitude experienced by minority religious believers. Prejudice
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Exercise claims:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must
be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of
all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.16
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor condemned the
majority's offhanded discounting of minority belief systems.
Justice O'Connor castigated the Court's abrogation of strict
scrutiny for unintended burdens on religious liberty as
"dramatically depart[ing] from well-settled First Amendment
jurisprudence" 7 in favor of an approach that is antithetical to
the Constitution's intended solicitude for non-mainstream
religious beliefs:
The Court today suggests that the disfavoring of minority
religions is an "unavoidable consequence" under our system
of government and that accommodation of such religions
must be left to the political process. In my view, however,
the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the
rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by
the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history
of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging
religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Amish.18
B. Post-Smith Interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause-
Solidifying the Erosion of Religious Freedom
While individual Justices have volleyed attacks on Smith,
prospects for judicially restoring strict scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause remain dim. The United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the vitality of Smith in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
16. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
17. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun likewise inveighed
against the majority for "effectuat[ing] a wholesale overturning of settled law
concerning the Religion Clauses." Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). While
advocating strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor found that the government had met
its burden of establishing a compelling interest that would be undermined if the
First Amendment afforded exemptions from laws criminalizing possession of
peyote. Id. at 904-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting majority at 889).
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Inc. v. Hialeah.'9 The case arose out of a challenge to city
ordinances that criminalized animal sacrifices. As a
consequence of the ordinances, religious rituals of members of
the Santeria religion, whose devotion to spirits is expressed
through sacrifice of animals, were outlawed. The Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, whose congregants practice the Santeria
religion, filed a civil action averring that these ordinances
violated the Free Exercise Clause.20
The Supreme Court began its analysis by endorsing the
watered-down standard of scrutiny adopted in Smith-that a
law that is neutral and generally applicable but that has the
effect of burdening a religious practice need not be justified by
a compelling governmental interest.2' The Court found,
however, that the Hialeah ordinances were neither neutral nor
generally applicable; to the contrary, the object of the
ordinances was to suppress the religious practices of the
followers of the Santeria faith.' The city council accomplished
this goal by selectively burdening only sacrifices motivated by
religious beliefs while authorizing the killing of animals for
secular purposes.' Thus, the Court subjected the legislation to
strict scrutiny and concluded that the City of Hialeah's
ordinances failed both prongs of the operable test. The city did
not have a compelling interest in outlawing religious sacrifices
and did not seek to achieve its objectives by means least
restrictive of religious conduct.24
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter plotted a roadmap
for future litigants wishing to have the Court override Smith
and restore strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause for
unintended burdens on religious liberty. Justice Souter
dismissed as dictum the majority's purported affirmance of the
Smith rule for neutral and generally applicable legislation that
has the effect of burdening religion, as the ordinances in
19. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
20. See id at 523-30.
21. See id. at 531.
22. See id. at 532-42. For example, the ordinance exempted the slaughtering of
Kosher meat within the city limits. The Court found no need to consider whether
the differential treatment of two religions was itself unconstitutional but relied
upon the exemption as evidence of the legislature's intent to repress the Santeria
religion. See id.
23. See id. at 54246.
24. See id. at 546-47.
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question were enacted with the purpose of invading the
religious rituals of the Santeria.25 Justice Souter then called for
a wholesale re-examination of Smith in a future case that levied
a constitutional attack on a law that had the effect, but not the
purpose, of burdening religion.
In the balance of his concurring opinion, Justice Souter
outlined why he believed it appropriate to reconsider Smith.
First, Justice Souter analyzed at length why Smith could not be
reconciled with the Supreme Court's precedents existing at the
time that the Court issued the Smith opinion, precedents that
the Smith Court did not overrule. 26 He then offered five reasons
why principles of stare decisis do not preclude reconsideration
of the Smith rule as it applies to neutral and generally
applicable laws with the effect, albeit not the purpose, of
burdening religion. First, neither the petitioner nor respondent
in Smith had advocated abandonment of strict scrutiny for laws
that unintentionally invaded the free exercise of religion.27
Because the new test for Free Exercise claims was rendered
without benefit of "'full-dress argument"' on that issue, the
"constitutional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less
deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument.""
Second, the precedential weight of Smith is further diminished
by the fact that it was not necessary for the Smith Court to
abrogate strict scrutiny in order to uphold the statute
criminalizing use of peyote. Instead, the Court could have
followed Justice O'Connor's reasoning and found that the state
had a compelling interest that could not be satisfied by less
restrictive alternatives.2 9  Consequently, the new rule
announced in Smith "approaches without more the sort of 'dicta
... which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which
are not controlling." Third, because the new test adopted in
Smith is in its infancy, the policy underlying stare decisis is
25. See id. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring).
26. See id. at 564-71 (Souter, J., concurring) (relying primarily on Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)(noting that some conduct protected by the Free
Exercise clause lies beyond the ability of the government to regulate and that a
facially neutral law may still be unconstitutional if it unduly burdens religion).
27. See id. at 571-72 (Souter, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 572.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 573 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627
(1935)).
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weaker than if the decision had been relied upon over a
substantial period of time.31 Fourth, because the Smith Court
did not overrule precedents that applied strict scrutiny to all
Free Exercises claims, re-examination of Smith is not only
wholly consistent with stare decisis, but also necessary to
resolve "an intolerable tension in free-exercise law."32 Finally,
Justice Souter justified his call for review of Smith by the fact
that the Smith majority failed to consider the text and historic
origins of the Free Exercise Clause of the United States
Constitution.33 While the claims in Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye
did not present the opportunity to review the application of
strict scrutiny to neutral and generally applicable laws that
have the effect of burdening a religious practice, Justice Souter
urged reconsideration in a case where the issue is squarely
presented.
There is little reason to believe that the Court will accept
Justice Souter's invitation to revisit Smith. Five Members of the
Court - Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Stevens,
Kennedy and Thomas-reaffirmed Smith in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye. Of the four Justices who voted in Smith for
retention of strict scrutiny for all Free Exercise claims, only
Justice O'Connor remains on the Court. Justice Breyer, who
replaced Justice Blackmun, has joined Justice Souter in
advocating reconsideration of Smith.'4  On the other hand,
Justice Thomas, having succeeded Justice Marshall, endorsed
the Smith approach by joining the relevant part of the majority's
opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Justice Ginsburg,
who inherited the seat formerly occupied by Justice White,
implicitly assumed the correctness of Smith in City of Boerne v.
Flores.3 6  At present, then, it is questionable whether any
entreaty to the Court to reconsider Smith would command the
four Justices necessary to grant certiorari, much less garner the
31. See id. (Souter, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 573-74.
33. See id. at 574-77. In her dissenting opinion in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 549-65 (1997), Justice O'Connor detailed the historical evidence and
concluded that it supported protecting believers against unintended burdens on
religion created by neutral laws of general applicability. See also Michael
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
34. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520.
36. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
420 [Vol. 23
A Blessing in Disguise
majority needed to overrule the decision.
III. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SMITH
While federal judicial prospects for overruling Smith are dim,
Congress has approved legislation to safeguard minority
religions. Relying on its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment," Congress overwhelmingly passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).38
Congress made no attempt to disguise the fact that it was
enacting RFRA as a direct response to Smith. The statute
includes Congress' finding that the Smith decision "virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral towards
religion."3 9 The purpose of RFRA, set forth unambiguously in
the statute, is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."4 °
As the title of RFRA suggests, Congress legislatively restored
strict scrutiny for federal, state, and local governmental actions
that have the effect of burdening the exercise of a person's
religion, even if that burden was imposed through a law of
general applicability.4' The person whose religious exercise is
infringed may assert a violation of RFRA "as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government."' The government could justify the burden only
if it demonstrates both a compelling governmental interest and
the lack of any less restrictive means of furthering that
compelling interest.43
RFRA manifests Congress's sensitivity to the inability of the
37. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 1 (1993), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1903.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 5.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -4 (1994). RFRA passed the House of
Representatives without opposition, and only three senators voted against the
Act. 139 CONG. REc. 2356-03, 2363; 139 CONG. REc. 8713-04, 8715; 139 CONG. REC.
S14461-01, S14471.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c); see infra Part IV(D).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
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political process to protect non-mainstream faiths. The Senate
Report acknowledges that "[s]tate and local legislative bodies
cannot be relied upon to craft exceptions from laws of general
application to protect the ability of religious minorities to
practice their faiths . . . ."44 The statute expressly recites
Congress's finding that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise."
45
The Supreme Court dashed the promise RFRA afforded
minority adherents when it declared the statute
unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.46 Boerne arose out of
the city's denial of the Archbishop of San Antonio's application
for a building permit seeking to enlarge his church to
accommodate the growing number of parishioners. The
Archbishop brought a civil action contesting the denial of the
permit, which included a claim that the city of Boerne had
violated RFRA.47
The Supreme Court's holding that RFRA was
unconstitutional rested on two interrelated structural grounds.
First, because Congress did not have the authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact RFRA,
Congress disturbed the constitutional allocation of power
between the federal government and the states.4" Second, by
attempting to countermand the Court's Smith decision,
Congress offended the principles of horizontal separation of
powers, invading the province of the judiciary.49
The first basis on which the Court declared RFRA
unconstitutional was that Congress acted beyond its
enforcement power conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court acknowledged that Congress has
great discretion in selecting how to enforce the substantive
provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment most
effectively. 0 Although Congress may strive to deter or remedy
44. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 1 (1993), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,1897.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
46. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
47. See id. at 512.
48. See id. at 520-35.
49. See id. at 536.
50. See id. at 520. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant
part-. ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . .". U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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violations by barring conduct that is of itself constitutional,5l it
is not empowered to expand the definition of the right itself.5 2
The Boerne Court concluded that RFRA was not an effort to
redress documented instances of purposeful incursions on
religious liberty-the only invasions that, after Smith, the Free
Exercise Clause demands be justified by compelling
governmental interests5 3 Instead, Congress attempted to
expand the reach of the Constitution by legislating strict
scrutiny for unintended burdens on religious freedom created
by neutral laws of general applicability. The Court found that
the power improperly exerted by Congress was comparable to
the federal legislative authority sought in the first draft of the
Fourteenth Amendment authored by Representative Bingham.
This initial draft assigned Congress the power to "make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities... and...
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property." 4
The draft amendment was roundly opposed on the ground that
it represented an unwarranted trespass upon the responsibility
of the states."5 Likewise, the Boerne Court reasoned, RFRA
manifested "a considerable congressional intrusion into the
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens." 6
The Boerne Court found that not only did Congress intrude
on the authority of the states when it worked a substantive
expansion of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it also encroached
upon the province of the United States Supreme Court. The
Framers of the Constitution sought to preserve liberty by
erecting multiple divisions of power amongst the branches of
government. Beyond parceling the legislative power between
the federal and state government, the Constitution cordons the
51. See id. at 518.
52. See id. at 519.
53. The Court found a stark absence in the legislative record of historic
evidence that religious intolerance was intentionally promoted through the Trojan
horse of laws of general applicability. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
530-31 (1997). Even were there such evidence in the record, the Court reasoned,
the scope of RFRA extended far beyond laws likely to be motivated by religious
bigotry. See id. at 532-35.
54. Id. at 520.
55. See id. at 520-21.
56. Id. at 534.
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power of Congress from that of the judicial branch of the
federal government. RFRA, the Court concluded, was an effort
to superimpose upon future cases the legislature's preference
for - rather than the Court's interpretation of-the scope of
the right to free exercise of religion under the United States
Constitution. By its action, Congress arrogated the Court's
exclusive authority, declared in Marbury v. Madison,7 "to say
what the law is."58 As the Court tersely admonished, "it is the
Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control."59
Boerne did not mark the end of federal efforts to legislate
strict scrutiny for deprivations of religious exercise
unintentionally imposed by neutral laws of general
applicability.6" Commentators opined that Congress could
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
59. Id.
60. The lower federal courts have divided over whether RFRA is
unconstitutional when applied to actions of the federal, as opposed to state and
local government. See In re Grand Jury Empaneling of Special Grand Jury, 171
F.3d 826 (3d Cir. 1999).
Courts have since disagreed over whether RFRA is constitutional as
applied to the federal government .... Here .. .we need not decide
whether any part of RFRA survives [City ofBoerne v.] Flores, because we
conclude that the federal government's action in this case would survive
strict scrutiny even under the rigorous RFRA standard.
Id. at 829; Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 F.3d 826, 830 (9th
Cir. 1999) ("[M]ost courts that have considered the issue have concluded that the
Supreme Court invalidated RFRA only as applied to state and local law."); United
States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts
disagree as to the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal governmental
action); McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, unpublished opinion, No. 97-1701, 1998 WL 879503,
at n.2 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Boerne
"arguably casts some doubt on the continued viability of that legislation in the
federal context"); Browne v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (D. Vt. 1998)
(doubting that RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law, but noting that,
"even assuming the constitutionality of RFRA and accepting as true the plaintiff's
allegation that voluntary compliance substantially burdens their practice of
religion, the plaintiff's complaint fails as a matter of law. Here, voluntary
compliance with federal income tax laws is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling governmental interest."); In re Gates Community Chapel,
Inc., 212 B.R. 220, 225-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (construing Boerne as mooting
debtor's argument that payment of post-confirmation United States trustee fees
violates RFRA); see also cases collected in Edward J.W. Blatnik, No RFRA Allowed:
The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1412 nn.10-11 (1998); Eugene
Gressman, The Necessary and Proper Downfall ofRFRA, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 73, 81 (1997)
[hereinafter Downfall] ("Boerne had no occasion to assess RFRA's constitutionality
with respect to its application to federal statutes and regulations ... ."); Eugene
Gressman, RFRA: A Comedy of Necessary and Proper Errors, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
507, 529 (1999) [hereinafter Comedy] ("Since RFRA still contains all the elements of
a separation of powers violation, RFRA cannot be considered a valid or proper
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restore strict scrutiny for unintended burdens on religion while
passing constitutional muster under Boerne by either a)
expanding the legislative record or more narrowly tailoring the
act to satisfy the standards that Boerne demanded for remedial
legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; or b)
relying upon the Spending Power,6 the Commerce Power62 or
Congress's power to implement treaties,63 rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the basis for mandating the
compelling governmental interest/least restrictive alternative
test for all burdens on religious liberty.'
The House of Representatives pursued both strategies when
on July 15, 1999 it approved the Religious Liberty Protection
Act of 1999 (RLPA). s First, Congress relied upon its powers
under the Spending and Commerce Clauses in tailoring
RLPA.66 Section 2 of the Act prohibits the government from
substantially burdening religious liberty through rules of
general applicability a) in "a program or activity, operated by a
government, that receives Federal financial assistance"; or b)
"in any case in which the substantial burden on the person's
religious exercise affects, or in which a removal of that burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the
amendment to ... any... federal law enacted in execution of an Article I power of
Congress.").
The House of Representatives apparently believed that RFRA remained in effect
as against the federal government when it approved The Religious Liberty
Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999). The Act amends RFRA to
confine its reach to the federal government without altering the extant substantive
limitations RFRA imposed. See H.R. 1691,106th Cong. § 7 (1999).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... ").
62. See id. § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States ....").
63. See id. § 8, cl. 18 ( "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States .... ).
64. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of
Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom From
State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. L=ITLE ROCK Lj. 633 (1998); Thomas C.
Berg, The Constitutional Failure of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LrrLE
ROCK L.J. 715 (1998); Yehuda M. Braunstein, Will Jewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again?
Legislative Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333 (1998);
Rodney K. Smith, Responding to the Supreme Court's Effort to End the Conversation
about Religious Exemptions and Welcoming Professor Sullivan to the Debate, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 487 (1998).
65. H.R. 1691,106th Cong. (1999).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219 (1999).
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several States, or with Indian tribes."67 The government,
however, could carry its burden by demonstrating a
compelling interest that could not be satisfied by an alternative
means less restrictive of the religious exercise in issue.68
Congress also drew upon its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it promulgated discrete
standards for land use regulations that substantially burden
religious exercise. Where the "government has authority to
make individualized assessments of the proposed uses to
which real property would be put," the government must
prove that any substantial burden on religious exercise furthers
a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.69  RLPA further bars
government agencies from crafting land use regulations that a)
treat religious institutions on terms less favorably than
nonreligious institutions;0 b) discriminate on the basis of
religion or religious denomination;' or c) unreasonably
exclude or limit institutions principally devoted to religious
exercise.n
The fate of federal legislative efforts to reinstate the
safeguarding of minority faiths eviscerated by Smith remains
uncertain both as a political and constitutional matter. While
RLPA passed the House, no counterpart Senate bill has been
introduced. 73 Even were the Senate to introduce and pass
67. H.R. 1691, § 2(a). To state a prima facie case under this section, the plaintiff
must prove as an element of the cause of action that the burden on religious
exercise affects commerce within the meaning of the Court's interpretations of the
Commerce Clause. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219.
68. See H.R. 1691, § 2(b).
69. Id. § 3(b)(1)(A).
70. See id. § 3(b)(1)(B).
71. See id. § 3(b)(1)(C).
72. See id. § 3(b)(1)(D). The House averred that Congress has the power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy land use regulations by
imposing a more rigorous standard of scrutiny than generally required under the
Free Exercise Clause because, as demanded by Boerne, hearings established
sufficient statistical as well as anecdotal evidence of "a widespread pattern of
religious discrimination in land use regulation." H.R. REP. No. 106-291 (1999); see
also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526, 531. Moreover, the House asserted, strict scrutiny was
consonant with the portion of the Court's opinion in Smith insisting upon
continued proof of a compelling governmental interest and no less restrictive
alternatives to justify inadvertent burdens on religious liberty where
governmental bodies have authority to make individualized assessments of thejustification for official actions. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531; see also H.R. Rep. No.
106-291 (1999); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
73. See House Passes Bill to Limit States' and Localities' Power to Curb Religious
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RLPA and procure the President's signature,74 challenges to the
constitutionality of RLPA are inevitable. Representatives
Conyers, Scott, Watt, Waters, Meehan and Baldwin filed a
dissenting analysis to the House Report on RLPA, expressing
their belief that a) RLPA could not be sustained under
Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment75  b) rather than insulate the bill from
constitutional attack, reliance upon the Commerce and
Spending Powers created additional constitutional problems,76
and c) like RFRA, RLPA arguably usurped the authority of the
Supreme Court by imposing an across-the-board strict scrutiny
Activities, CONG. Q. WKLY., July 17,1999, at 1730. The Senate Judiciary Committee
did hold a hearing on RLPA on September 9,1999. See 68 U.S.L.W. 2157 (Sept. 21,
1999). One of the four scholars testifying, Jay S. Bybee, opined that RLPA is not
constitutional. See id.
74. It is not a foregone conclusion that the Senate and President would support
RLPA in its present form. The American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights
Campaign, and NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund opposed RLPA
because of its potential use as a justification for discrimination. See House Passes
Bill to Limit States'and Localities'Power to Curb Religious Activities, CONG. Q. WKLY.,
July 17,1999, at 1730; see also infra Part IV(C)(3)(b).
75. Since Boerne, the Court has continued to closely 'examine remedial
legislation premised upon Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-10 (1999), the Court held that Congress did not have the
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it enacted the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994), because the legislative record
had not identified any pattern of unremedied patent infringement or
constitutional violations by the states. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S.
Ct. 631 (2000), the Court struck down the 1974 Amendment to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 630(B), that
extended the Act's substantive requirements to the states. While accepting that
Congress intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, the
Court held that Congress exceeded its Section 5 power by imposing substantiveproscriptions against age discrimination that surpassed the prohibitions of the
Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because
there was little evidence in the legislative record that state governments were
engaged in widespread unconstitutional discrimination, the Court concluded that
the amendment to the ADEA was not an effort to design an appropriate remedy
for violations of the Equal Protection Clause but instead was "merely an attempt
to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations with respect to age
discrimination.' Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648. The Court has granted certiorari to
consider whether the provision of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, 42
U.S.C. § 13981, creating a private right of action for victims of crimes of violence
motivated by gender exceeds Congress's power under the Enforcement Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted, U.S. v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 11 (1999) (Mem.).
76. See Gressman, Comedy, supra note 60, at 534 ("[N]o matter what Article I
power Congress seeks to employ, there is no way to insulate any federal statute
• .. from the constitutional limitations built into the Necessary and Proper
Clause.").
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standard for burdens on religious liberty, the very standard
that the Court repudiated in Smith.'
Even were RLPA to survive political opposition and
constitutional challenges, it would fail to furnish complete
relief to persons whose religious practices are infringed by state
entities. RLPA does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of states;78 consequently, individuals whose religious
exercise is encumbered in violation of RLPA could not recover
damages from the state in an action filed in federal court. Nor
may the victim recover damages from the state by filing suit in
state court. In a decision issued on the final day of the last
Term, the Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine79 held that Congress
lacks the power under Article I of the Constitution to subject
non-consenting states to suits for damages in their own court.80
Hence a person whose religion is burdened by a neutral law
passed by a state legislature could at most procure prospective
relief for the violation of RLPA but could not recover damages
for the harm caused prior to judgment.8'
IV. PROTECrING RELGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER STATE STATUTES
While federal statutory efforts to restore strict scrutiny for
unintended infringement of religious liberty remain in political
77. See H.R. REP. No. 106-291, at 32-40 (1999). The Department of Justice agreed
that "RLPA raises important and difficult constitutional questions," but
concluded that the act was constitutional. 145 CONG. REC. 5594 (daily ed. July 15,
1999); see also Steven D. Smith, Mother May We?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 501, 506
(1999).
Whether Congress has the power to enact RFRA-type legislation is
ultimately within the discretion of the Supreme Court. There is no way to
tell how the Court will exercise this discretion, no way to compel the
Court to exercise its discretion in any particular way, and no way to
demonstrate that in its exercise of discretion the Court got the right
answer or the wrong answer.
Id.
78. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219. To the extent that RLPA rests upon the
Commerce and Spending Clauses, Congress does not have the power to override
the states' immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
79. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
80. See id.
81. RLPA provides a cause of action to "obtain appropriate relief against a
government." H.R. 1691,106th Cong. § 4(a) (1999). The text of the statute does not
prescribe whether individual state officials are suable for violating the act.
However, a state official who is sued for enforcing a rule of general applicability
that burdened religion would likely be protected by qualified immunity in any
action for damages under RLPA. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
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and constitutional limbo, state statutes afford greater promise
for reinstating the compelling interest/no less restrictive
alternatives test for burdens on religious exercise imposed by
neutral laws of general applicability.s2 Properly drafted, state
religious freedom acts are not infected by the constitutional
infirmities that doomed RFRA and that dangle over the
proposed federal Religious Liberty Protection Act. To the
contrary, the Boerne Court's rebuff of Congress's effort to
restore the rights of religious minorities to expansive protection
of their beliefs paves the road to the constitutionality of
guaranteeing that religious liberty through state statutes.
A. State Religious Freedom Acts Do Not Rest upon the Power to
Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
As previously analyzed, 3 the first basis on which the Court
declared RFRA unconstitutional was that Congress acted
beyond its powers conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. By exceeding its enumerated authority, the Court
reasoned, Congress arrogated "the States' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health
and welfare of their citizens." 84
While the Court's conclusion deprived the United States
Congress of the power to enact RFRA in its then-existing form,
underlying the Court's repudiation lies express authority for
state legislatures to achieve the same result. State legislatures
seeking to insulate minority faiths against burdens imposed by
laws of general applicability do not draw upon any power to
remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Rather, as asserted expressly by the
Arizona legislature in enacting its religious freedom restoration
act, "Under its police power, the legislature may establish
protections that . . . supplement rights guaranteed by the
Constitution."85 State legislation that broadens the guarantee of
82. Professor Lupu submits, however, that any attempt to capture religious
freedom generally through legislative means ultimately stultifies advancement of
religious liberty. See Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of
Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1999).
83. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
84. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,534 (1997).
85. S. 1391, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ariz. 1999). The Arizona legislature
was relying upon its power to supplement rights founded in the Arizona, rather
than the federal, constitution. Nonetheless, the source of that police power
No. 2]
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religious liberty against unintended infringement falls squarely
within the ambit of the states' "traditional prerogative" to
preserve the welfare of its citizens that the United States
Congress invoked when it enacted RFRA.
In the Federalist No. 45, James Madison, summarizing the
federal-state balance intended by the Framers, asserted that the
power to promote civil liberties would repose in the states:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
Federal Government are few and defined. Those which are
to remain in the State Governments are numerous and
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on
external objects, as war, peace, negociation [sic], and foreign
commerce. The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.86
Consistent with Madison's description of the allocation of
power to promote civil rights, for the first 150 years of our
Nation it was left to state law to guarantee religious freedom
against breach by state and local governments. The liberties
enshrined in the original Bill of Rights were secured only
against federal incursion. 7 While the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 afforded some federal
constitutional restriction of state and local governmental acts, it
was not until 1940 that the Supreme Court held that the rights
safeguarded by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment were fundamental and hence enforceable against
the states.88
Even before the United States Supreme Court's pre-Smith
jurisprudence constitutionally compelled that states avoid
unintended burdens on religious exercise, state laws supplied
exemptions to religious objectors from otherwise neutral,
generally applicable laws.8 9 Indeed, the tradition of state
remains the same. See also Lupu, supra note 82, at 588 ("[Wlith respect to the
states, each of their legislatures possesses the police power, which encompasses all
matters of health, welfare, safety, and morals. Surely the enhancement of
religious freedom falls within a power grant as capacious as this.")
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 303 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed.,
1976) (emphasis added).
87. See Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243(1833).
88. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940),
89. States have allowed religious exemptions in the following areas: civil duties,
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see HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-6 (1993) (a person may claim exemption from service as
a juror if the person is a minister or priest); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2101(b)
(West 1976) (all persons who because of religious belief claim exemption from
militia service shall be exempted in combatant capacity); criminal prosecution, see
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-272a (West 1995) (anyone who engages in the ritual
slaughter of animals is exempt from criminal prosecution); IDAHO CODE
§ 37-2732A (1994) (persons of Native American descent are exempt from criminal
sanctions for the sacramental use of peyote); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639.3 (1996)
("a person who, pursuant to the tenets of a recognized religion, fails to conform to
the existing duty of care or protection he owes to a child or incompetent is not
guilty of child endangerment"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2331.11 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1999) ("persons who, on their traditional day of worship are within, going
to or returning from their place of worship, are worshiping at service, or are going
to or returning from service, are privileged from arrest"); education, see S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-1.1 (Michie 1991) (a child of compulsory school age who
has successfully completed the first eight grades is excused from compulsory
school attendance if child or parents of child are members of recognized church
that objects to regular public high school attendance and if that church provides a
supervised program of instruction for that child); employment, see N.D. CENT.
CODE § 34-06-05.1 (Supp. 1997) (an employer must provide an employee with at
least one period of twenty-four hours oftime off for rest or worship in each
seven-day period); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.010 (1997) (individuals employed on a
seasonal basis at an organized religious camp are exempt from minimum wage
standard); licensing requirements and building regulations, see ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-1421A (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (medical licensing requirements do
not apply to any person engaged in the practice of religion, treatment by prayer,
or the laying on of hands as a religious rite or ordinance); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 595.17 (West 1996) (marriage provisions on procuring licenses and
solemnization are not applicable to members of a denomination having an
unusual mode of entering into the marriage relation); KAN. STAT ANN. § 66-1,109
(1992 & Supp. 1998) (any motor carrier owned by religious organizations or
institutions are not required to obtain license, certificate, or permit from State
Corporation Commission or file rates, tariffs annual reports, or provide proof of
insurance with Commission); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 5-102 (1998) (any
person who owns and operates a bona fide religious, nonprofit cemetery is
exempt from registration and permitting provisions for cemeteries); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 171.071 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999) (where licensee has religious objections
to the use of electronically produced images, he is exempt from photo
identification requirement on driver's license); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 116-15(d) (1994)
(no institution offering post-secondary degree in theology, divinity, or religious
education shall be subject to licensure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 6-265 (West
1993) (persons slaughtering, processing, or handling poultry products that are
processed as required by recognized religious dietary laws are exempt from
inspection, sanitation, and shipping requirements); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-660
(Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1998) (churches are exempt from licensing
requirements for engaging in the tobacco business); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-196.3
(Michie 1995) (hospices established or operated for the practice of religious tenets
of any recognized church that provide care for the sick by spiritual means without
the use of any drug or material remedy are exempt from licensure); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 101.05 (West 1997) (school buildings are exempt from building codes if the
teachings and beliefs of the religious denomination that operates the school
prohibit the use of certain products, devices, or designs that are necessary to
comply with building regulations); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-13-104 (Michie 1999)
(all religious organizations or institutions are exempt from dance hall licensure);
medical testing and health regulations, see ALA. CODE § 16-30-3 (1995) (school
children are exempt from immunization if parent or guardian objects in writing
that the immunization or testing conflicts with religious tenets); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-15-303 (Michie 1991) (,TNewborn infants are exempt from tests for
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legislatures preserving the liberty of individuals to pursue their
religious conscience dates back to colonial times.9 0 As Justice
O'Connor observed after reviewing the historic evidence in
Boerne, "long before the First Amendment was ratified,
legislative accommodations were a common response to
conflicts between religious practices and civil obligation."9'
Both the judicial and legislative branches of the federal
government have endorsed the states' power to preserve the
free exercise of religion against incursion by statutes of general
applicability. The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged that so long as the state legislature does not
violate the constraints of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution,92 legislative
accommodation of religion "follows the best of our
traditions." 9' Even Congress has recognized the states' role
and power in protecting religious liberty, as the enforcement
section of the proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999
provides, "Nothing in this subsection shall preempt State law
that is equally or more protective of religious exercise."
94
phenylketonuria, hypothyroidism, and sickle-cell anemia if parents object on the
grounds that they conflict with tenets and practices of a recognized church or
religious faith of which the parent is a member or adherent."); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
27491.43 (West 1988) (a coroner may not perform an autopsy or remove tissue,
glands, or organs of decedent if he has received a certificate that the procedure
would be contrary to decedent's religious beliefs); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-17
(1999) (school children whose parents object on religious grounds are exempt
from required spinal curvature screening); N.Y. PUs. HEALTH LAW § 2500-e
(McKinney 1993) (infants born to a mother who tests positive for hepatitis B are
exempt from immunization if the parents hold a genuine and sincere religious
belief which prohibits such immunization); and taxation, see ALASKA STAT. §
29.45.030 (Michie 1998) (property used exclusively for nonprofit religious
purposes, including residence of bishop, priest, rabbi, or minister and structures
used solely for public worship, is exempt from general taxation); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 7.1-4-3-5 (Michie 1996) (liquor excise tax does not apply to the sale or
withdrawal for sale of wine to pastor, rabbi, or priest for sacramental or religious
purposes only); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:43 (West 1987) ("No amusement tax shall
be levied with respect to any admission to any church fair, church card or lotto
party, church lecture, church picnic, or religious festival, all of the proceeds of
which inure to the benefit of religious institutions."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
64H, § 6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (books used for religious worship are exempt
from sales tax).
90. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 557-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that at
the time the Bill of Rights was ratified, the colonies and early states accepted that
government should exempt religious objectors from general laws).
91. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 559 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. U.S. CONST., amend. 1; see infra Part IV(C)(5).
93. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,314 (1951).
94. H.R. 1691,106th Cong. § 3(b)(3) (1999).
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Eight states-Rhode Island, 5  Connecticut," Illinois,'
Florida,9" South Carolina," Arizona,' 0 Texas,'0 ' and Idaho"02 -
have exercised their police powers to enact laws requiring the
exemption of religious objectors from neutral laws of general
applicability unless the state can prove a compelling interest
that cannot be satisfied by alternatives less restrictive of the
exercise of religion.'0 3 In two other states, California and New
95. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (1998).
96. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571(b) (1997).
97. See H.R. 2370, 90th Leg. (Ill. 1998).
98. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01 (West 1998).
99. See H.R. 3158,113th Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999).
100. See S. 1056, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1999).
101. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110 (West 1999).
102. See S.B. 1394,55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Idaho 2000).
103. Many other states have considered religious freedom acts. On March 24,
1998, Louisiana legislators introduced the Louisiana Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, H.R. 167,1998 First Extraordinary Sess. (La. 1998). Supporters of
the act dropped efforts to pass it after the House Committee on Civil Law voted 6-
4 to adopt an amendment that would preclude prisoners from asserting the
broadened protections for religious liberty afforded by the act. See Joanna Weiss,
Religious Freedom Measure Pulled, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 1, 1998, at
A3. The bill resurfaced in 1999 without the prisoner's exemption. See H.R. 1522,
1999 Reg. Sess. (La. 1999). On June 10, 1999, the sponsor of the bill withdrew the
legislation from consideration because he believed the Department of Correction
would dramatically alter the bill. Telephone Interview with Robert Singletary,
counsel for the Louisiana House of Representatives (June 11, 1999). On June 17,
1999, Representative Long introduced a resolution that requested the Louisiana
House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure to discuss the ramifications of
enacting state protection of religious liberty and to report the findings to the
House of Representatives prior to the convening of the 2000 Regular Session. See
H.R. 111, 1999 Reg. Sess. (La. 1999). The measure passed the House of
Representatives and was enrolled and signed by the speaker on June 21,1999.
Two weeks after Boerne, New York legislators introduced a religious freedom
bill to restore the compelling interest test. See S. 5673, 220th Annual Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1997). After failing to pass both houses, the bill was reintroduced in 1999.
See S. A05139, 1999 Reg. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999). On June 17, 1999, the bill passed
the New York Assembly and was referred to the New York Senate Rules
Committee. The bill died in the Senate and returned to the New York Assembly
on January 5, 2000. On January 11, 2000, the bill was discharged by the Rules
Committee and committed to Governmental Operations. See
<http://assembly.state.ny.us/cgi-bin/showbill?binum=A05139>.
In 1998 and 1999, Maryland legislators proposed and then withdrew the
Maryland Religious Freedom Act. See S. 674, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1999),
<http://mlis.state.md.us/1999rs/billfileSB674.htm>; H.R. 1041, 1998 Reg. Sess.
(Md. 1998); 5. 515, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998). On January 13, 1998, New Jersey
legislators introduced the New Jersey Religious Freedom Act. See A. 903, S. 321,208th Leg. (N.J. 1998). The bill died after the Office of Legislative Services issued
an opinion concluding that the Act would violate the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
See Ellen Friedland, New Grounds for RFRA Attach in NJ Senate, N.J. JEWISH NEWS,
Apr. 2, 1999. On January 11, 2000, A.B. 412, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000), creating the
New Jersey Religious Freedom Act, was introduced and referred to the Assembly
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Mexico, the legislature passed a religious freedom act but the
Governor vetoed the legislation.' 4 Although having the net
effect of imposing a standard of scrutiny rejected by the United
Judiciary Committee. See <http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2000/Bills/a0500/
412_il.htm>. In the summer of 1997, Michigan legislators introduced the Michigan
Religious Freedom Act. See H.R. 4376, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); S.
678, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997). The Act never emerged from the
Senate Judiciary Committee and was reintroduced in the Michigan Senate on
February 3, 1999. See S. 235, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1999). Senate Bill 235 is not
scheduled to be heard in committee. See Telephone Interview with Joe O'Reilly,
aide to the bill's sponsor (June 8, 1999). Because the Supreme Court of Michigan,
in Kerr v. Hoffus, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998), construed the state constitution to
demand strict scrutiny of inadvertent burdens on religious exercise, some
legislators have questioned the utility of a state religious freedom act. See S. 235,
1999 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1999). On January 14, 1998, Virginia legislators offered a
bill to preserve religious freedom by mandating strict scrutiny of all substantial
burdens on religious liberty. See H.R. 1, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Va. 1998). The bill was
referred to the House Courts of Justice Committee, which took no action on the
bill. See <http://eg.l.state.va.us/cgi-bin/leg5O4.ex?991+sum+HB1>. S.B. 448
was offered on January 24, 2000 but was defeated in the Courts of Justice on
February 13,2000. See <http://eg.l.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legpSO4.exe?ses=001+typ
=bills+val=hb1255>. Religious Freedom Acts also have been introduced in
Georgia, H.R. 1123, 20th Leg. (Ga. 1999), S. 1447, 20th Leg. (Ga. 1999); Missouri,
H.R. 1799, 2000 Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000); Oregon, H.R. 3469,70th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess.
(Or. 1999); Hawaii, H.B. 1696, 20th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ha. 1999); Indiana, H.B. 1264,
111th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2000); and Oklahoma, S.B. 1162, 47th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ok. 2000).
Alabama voters approved an amendment to the state constitution prohibiting
burdening of the free exercise of religion unless government proves a compelling
interest that cannot be satisfied by alternatives less restrictive of the religious
exercise. See S. 604, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (approved by voters in the Nov.
1998 election).
104. See A. 1617, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (vetoed); S. 644, 44th Leg., 1st
Sess. (N.M. 1999) (vetoed). New Mexico Governor Johnson vetoed his state's bill
because of his belief that "[c]aution must be shown in the adoption of such
legislation due to the excessive litigation that may ensue, the costs that may be
incurred and the exceedingly personal conflicts over one's religion that may result
from the enactment of 'little RFRAs' rather than reliance upon existing first
amendment case law." Senate Executive Message No. 52, Apr. 8, 1999. The New
Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act was reintroduced on February 2, 2000.
H.B. 458, 44th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2000). California Governor Wilson vetoed the
California measure for several reasons. First he believed that the bill was
unnecessary because the California Constitution already had been construed to
require strict scrutiny for burdens on religious liberty imposed by neutral laws of
general applicability. See Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d
909 (Cal. 1996). Secondly, the Governor asserted that the least restrictive
alternative test was not mandated by the United States Supreme Court's pre-Snilh
Free Exercise precedents and thus the legislation went beyond the constitutional
protections that its sponsors sought to restore. Third, Governor Wilson alleged
that the Act would have untold and undesired consequences when relied upon by
prisoners and persons accused of crimes. Finally, Governor Wilson claimed that
the Act violated the state constitution by empowering the courts to amend
statutes by carving exceptions to later-enacted statutes. Governor Wilson urged
the California legislature instead to "decide on a bill-by-bill basis whether and
how to accommodate conduct motivated by religious concerns." Assembly Bill
1617 Veto, September 28,1998.
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States Supreme Court in Smith, these acts do not depend upon
any power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and hence do
not suffer from the first defect that doomed RFRA. Nor do
state religious freedom acts offend the second basis on which
the Boerne Court struck down RFRA-the Congressional
invasion of the Supreme Court's domain.
B. State Religious Freedom Acts Do Not Usurp the United States
Supreme Court's Power to Interpret the Federal Constitution.
The second basis on which the Boerne Court struck down
RFRA is that Congress had trespassed upon the Supreme
Court's prerogative to interpret the Constitution finally. This
aspect of the Court's Boerne decision, however, does not doom
efforts to legislate strict scrutiny under state law. Properly
drafted, state enactments to preserve religious liberty against
unintended governmental invasion do not challenge the United
States Supreme Court's primacy in interpreting the
Constitution.
The Federal Constitution merely fixes a floor of rights
beneath which the state may not fall."5 In establishing this
baseline of liberty, the Supreme Court is constrained by
federalism as well as the concern that the Court cannot reliably
ascertain the effect of mandating a right that must be respected106
by each of the fifty states and their subdivisions. States, not
inhibited by the same factors, have historically been viewed as
the laboratory for testing more generous treatment of
individual rights. 0 7 In fact, several state courts have liberally
interpreted the free exercise clauses of their own constitutions,
rejecting Smith and applying strict scrutiny to neutral rules of
general applicability.0 States that opt to legislate strict
scrutiny of unintended burdens on religious liberty do not
snub the Supreme Court; to the contrary, they act in the long
105. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
106. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
107. See New State Ice. Co., v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Kerr v. Hoffus, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998); State v. Bontrager,
683 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio App. Ct. 1996); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996);
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994); First
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); Rupert v. City of
Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1990); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
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and desired tradition of independence in ministering to the
unique needs of their constituents.
Interestingly, in a seemingly unrelated decision issued the
day after Boerne, the Supreme Court affirmed the prerogative
of states to prescribe rights broader than the Court's
interpretation of liberties guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. In Washington v. Glucksberg,'° the Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
embrace the right to physician-assisted suicide. The Court
conceded that it is restrained in declaring liberty interests
under the Fourteenth Amendment because recognizing a right
under the Due Process Clause would "place the matter outside
the arena of public debate and legislative action.""1 Rejecting a
federal constitutional mandate that a right to physician-assisted
suicide exists, the Court concluded, "permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society."1 1
State legislation preserving religious freedom against
inadvertent as well as purposeful burdens is the product of
public debate over the appropriate balance between the
demands of public order and the liberty of each and every
individual to pursue the dictates of that person's religion. The
democratic process may conclude that civil society can and
should accommodate the diversity of individual religious
beliefs absent compelling governmental interests that cannot be
satisfied by less restrictive alternatives. This conclusion does
not proclaim lack of obeisance to Supreme Court rulings.
Instead, the judgment to maximize the free exercise of religion
is entirely consistent with the constitutional scheme that
empowers each state to resolve the debate over affording
rights, above the threshold fixed by the Constitution, as the
majority sees fit.
Even the Smith Court did not assert that its repudiation of
strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause disempowered
the states from insisting that the government offer a weightier
justification to deny religious exemptions from laws of general
applicability. To the contrary, the Court recognized that its
decision would result in "leaving accommodation to the
109. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
110. Id. at 720.
111. Id. at 735.
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political process.""' Hence, unlike RFRA, state political
processes that choose to demand strict scrutiny in evaluating
unintended burdens on religious liberty do not step on the toes
of the United States Supreme Court.
C. Proper Drafting Is Necessary to Maximize the Constitutionality of
State Religious Freedom Acts
There is no intrinsic constitutional obstacle to state laws
guarding religious freedom from unintended burdens imposed
by neutral laws of general applicability. Careful drafting is
necessary, however, to ensure that the state legislature is not
accused of improperly seeking to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment or to second-guess the Court's construction of the
Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution.
1. State Religious Freedom Acts Should Specify the Power the
Legislature Is Exerting and Should Disassociate the Acts from the
Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution.
To insulate more completely its religious freedom act from a
Boerne-type attack, the state legislature should express that it is
relying upon its police power and should disavow any
interference with the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Federal Constitution. The Arizona and
Idaho legislatures refuted any inference that they were second-
guessing the Supreme Court's construction of the Federal
Constitution by including the finding that "this state has
independent authority to protect the free exercise of religion by
principles that are separate from, complementary to and more
expansive than the [F]irst [A]mendment of the United States
Constitution.""' The Texas legislature admirably was even
more explicit in staking out the independence of its religious
freedom act from the United States Constitution, RFRA, and its
progeny when it prescribed that "[t]he protection of religious
freedom afforded by this chapter is in addition to the
protections provided under federal law." "
112. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
113. S. 1391, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ariz. 1999); S.B. 1394, 55th Leg., 2d
Sess. § 1(4) (Idaho 2000).
114. TEx. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.009(b) (West 1999).
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Interestingly, several of the state religious freedom acts have
provisions acknowledging that the statute does not interpret,
address, or affect the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment." To make equally clear that the legislature does
not intend to quibble with the United States Supreme Court's
construction of the Free Exercise Clause, the state religious
freedom act should include the analogous proviso that
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to affect, interpret or in
any way address that portion of Amendment I of the United
States Constitution respecting the Free Exercise of Religion."
2. State Religious Freedom Statutes Should Be
"Non-Restoration " Acts
RFRA was unabashedly a direct reaction to the Supreme
Court's Smith decision. In the Preamble to the Act, Congress
recited that Smith "virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by
laws neutral toward religion."" 6 The stated purpose of RFRA,
reflected in the title of the act, was "to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder." 1 7  It was Congress' overt countermanding of the
Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that led to the
constitutional demise of RFRA.
A state legislature need not and should not characterize its
religious liberty act as an effort to restore First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights plundered by the United States Supreme
Court. To the contrary, the state religious freedom act should
be entirely one of non-restoration. The legislature should make
plain that rather than playing Monday-morning quarterback to
the Smith Court's reading of the Free Exercise Clause, the
legislature is providing for the health, safety, and welfare of the
citizens of the state by creating rights that are wholly
independent of the Federal Constitution and indifferent to the
Supreme Court's view of federal rights." 8
115. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.05(7) (West 1998) ("Nothing in this act shall
be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of s. 3, Art. I of
the State Constitution and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States respecting the establishment of religion.").
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1997).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
118. The United States House of Representatives appears to have learned this
lesson, as the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 makes no reference to Snith
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Unfortunately, the majority of state religious freedom acts
unnecessarily lug the unconstitutional baggage of RFRA. Six of
the eight enacted laws and one of the two vetoed acts are titled
or couched in terms of "restoration" of religious liberty."9
Perhaps least forgivable is the express reference in the body of
the legislation that the state is restoring religious liberty that
has been eradicated by the Supreme Court. Illinois titled its
legislation the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act" 2 ° and both
Illinois and South Carolina incorporated verbatim language
from RFRA concerning the effect of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Smith.'2' Both the Illinois and South Carolina acts
further include findings that the new enactment would
"restore" the compelling interest test.'22 The Arizona, Florida,
and Rhode Island statutes, as well as the vetoed New Mexico
bill, are similarly entitled the "Religious Freedom Restoration
Act," although they make no reference to Smith as the culprit
triggering the need for restoration.12'
The religious freedom statutes passed in Connecticut and
Texas as well as the vetoed California bill appropriately make
no reference in their title or text to restoration or to the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith. 24 Alluding to Smith or
restoration contributes little if anything to the meaning of the
state religious freedom act and invites an attack on the
constitutionality of this act similar to that lodged in Boerne.
Accordingly, drafters of state religious liberty acts should take
pains to purge all mention of Smith or restoration from the text
and history of the legislation.
and does not use the word "restoration" in the title or text of the Act. See H.R.
1691,106th Cong. (1999). On the other hand, the House Report betrays that RLPA
"was introduced, in part, in response to the Supreme Court's partial invalidation
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which itself was enacted in
1993 in response to [Smith]." H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 4 (1999).
119. See supra note 103.
120. H.R. 2370,90th Leg. § 1 (ll. 1998).
121. See Ill. H.B. 2370 § 10(a)(4); H.R. 3158, 113th Reg. Sess. Finding 4 (S.C.
1999).
122. See II. H.B. 2370 § 10(b)(1); S.C. H.R. 3158 § 1.
123. S. 1391, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1999); H.R. 3201, 1998 Reg. Sess. § 1
(Fla. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 42-80.1 (1998); S. 644, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. § 1 (N.M.
1999) (vetoed). The Idaho act provides that its statement of purpose is "to
reestablish" the compelling interest test that had been in effect before Smith. S.B.
1394,55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2000).
124. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571(b) (1997); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 110.009(b) (West 1999) (entitled "Religious Freedom Act"); A. 1617,
1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (vetoed) (entitled "Religious Freedom Protection
Act").
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3. State Religious Freedom Acts Should Not Incorporate
Pre-Smith Free Exercise Cases.
Many of the state religious freedom acts incorporate pre-
Smith decisions of the United States Supreme Court into the
compelling interest test established by the statute. These
provisions are seriously flawed in three ways. First,
incorporating pre-Smith decisions renders the state religious
freedom act vulnerable to the same constitutional attack that
buried RFRA. Second, adopting pre-Smith case law does not
resolve under what circumstances prevention of discrimination
is a compelling governmental interest that will defeat claims to
religious exemption under the act. Third, grafting the decisions
of the Supreme Court that existed before Smith creates
ambiguity as to the burden that government must bear to
justify infringement of the free exercise of religion by prisoners.
a. Incorporating Pre-Smith Cases May Subject State Religious
Freedom Acts to a Boerne Attack
Many of the state religious freedom acts may be accused of
being linked to the Fourteenth Amendment or to an attempt to
override the Supreme Court's decision in Smith by their
incorporation of the Court's pre-Smith decisions in the text of
the statute. Congress' constitutionally-flawed attempt to repeal
Smith in RFRA was manifested by its purpose, expressed on the
face of the statute, to resurrect the compelling interest test "set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder." I 5 Five of the
enacted state religious freedom acts likewise prescribe these
two pre-Smith Supreme Court decisions as defining the
standard of proof that government must meet to sustain a
burden on religion. The worst offenders, Illinois and South
Carolina, incorporate verbatim the language from RFRA in
their religious freedom restoration acts. 26 The Arizona and
Idaho Acts include the finding that "[t]he compelling interest
test, as set forth in the federal cases of Wisconsin v. Yoder and
Sherbert v. Verner, is a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing
governmental interests."127 The Florida Act, while not citing
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994) (citations omitted).
126. See III. H.R. 2370 at § 10(a)(6); S.C. H.R. 3158 at Finding No. 6.
127. Ariz. S. 1391 § 2(A)(6); S.B. 1394, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1(6) (Idaho
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directly to Yoder or Sherbert, refers instead to "certain federal
court rulings" as promulgating the compelling interest test that
the legislature finds suitable for balancing religious liberty and
governmental interests.'8 The explicit reference to pre-Smith
cases may generate accusations that like the United States
Congress, the state legislature is unconstitutionally attempting
to substitute its construction of the Free Exercise Clause for that
of the United States Supreme Court.
At the opposite extreme, without citation either to specific
Supreme Court cases or to federal law in general, both the
Connecticut and Rhode Island religious liberty acts, as well as
the vetoed New Mexico statute, require government to prove a
compelling interest and no less restrictive alternative to
maintain limitations on religious liberty imposed by neutral
rules of general applicability. 29 Redacting all references to
Yoder, Sherbert, and pre-Smith decisions of the Supreme Court
certainly is useful in sheltering state religious freedom acts
from charges that the legislature is usurping the United States
Supreme Court's power to interpret the Federal Constitution.
On the other hand, the statutes are as a consequence devoid of
any definition of the compelling interest/no less restrictive
alternatives test that government must satisfy to support
inadvertent burdens on free exercise."'
Two states attempted to offer guidance as to what
government interests are sufficiently compelling to justify
burdens on religion without directly incorporating pre-Smith
decisions of the Supreme Court into the legislation. The Texas
Religious Freedom Act states: "In determining whether an
2000).
128. Fla. H.R. 3201 (preamble).
129. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS, 42-80.1-
3(b)(2) (1998); S. 644,44th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(B) (N.M. 1999) (vetoed).
130. Professor Volokh suggests that legislatures should not attempt to constrain
judicial discretion initially to strike a balance between religious liberty and
governmental interests. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious
Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1494-1505 (1999). In fact, Professor Volokh
advocates that state RFRAs should not even impose strict scrutiny but instead
empower the courts to determine whether a burden on religious liberty is justified
"under the principles of the traditional law of [religious/conscientious]
exemptions as they may be developed, expanded, contracted, or modified by the
courts of [the jurisdiction] in light of reason and experience." Id. at 1503-04.
Professor Lupu similarly concludes that the prevailing judicial approach to
exemption claims-"religion sometimes wins, but the grounds on which it will do
so cannot be specified in advance" -will not be altered by any statutory formula
prescribed by religious liberty legislation. Lupu, supra note 82, at 579.
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interest is a compelling governmental interest..., a court shall
give weight to the interpretation of compelling interest in
federal case law relating to the free exercise of religion clause of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." 3' The
vetoed California Religious Freedom Protection Act likewise
offered more elaborate instruction as to the meaning of
"compelling" without adopting the holdings in Sherbert and
Yoder. In its findings, the legislature declared as follows:
The compelling governmental interest test in the Religious
Freedom Protection Act, as added by this act, has been used
repeatedly in case law relating to religious liberty and other
fundamental rights. It is expected that in applying this
standard in cases brought under the Religious Freedom
Protection Act, courts will look to that case law, including
decisions construing the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. [§] 2000bb et seq.). The Religious
Freedom Protection Act is not intended to codify or reject
the holding or reasoning of any particular case, including
cases construing the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act or any other federal or state statute. However, the
legislature respects the role that persuasive authority and
precedent play in the legal system and realizes that courts
are influenced in deciding cases by decisions that apply the
same standard to similar facts.132
While commendable in their aim, the Texas and California
acts risk underprotecting religion. Courts applying the acts are
obliged to "give weight to" or "respect[ ] the role of" federal
precedents holding that governmental interests proffered in a
particular case are not compelling; notwithstanding these
holdings, courts remain free to accept the same government
interests as compelling for purposes of the state religious
freedom act. Accordingly, a court partial to the policy
sentiment underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Smith
could approve burdens on minority faiths by deeming
compelling a broad array of governmental interests that federal
131. TEx. Cv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001(b) (West 1999).
132. A. 1617, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (Cal. 1998) (vetoed). While citing no
specific cases in its findings, the California legislature stated the purpose of the
statute was "[tlo codify the principle that government should not substantially
burden religious exercise without compelling justification, and then only by the
least restrictive means consistent with that compelling justification, as set forth in
People v. Woody [61 Cal. 2d 716 (1964)]; Sherbert v. Verner [374 U.S. 398 (1963)]; and
Wisconsin v. Yoder [406 U.S. 205 (1972)1." Id. § (b)(1) (italics added).
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courts had held were not compelling. 33
Perhaps stricter guidance could be given to the courts
interpreting the state religious freedom act while at the same
time distancing the statute from the infirmities that plagued
RFRA if the legislature specified the interests that are and are
not compelling." The vetoed California Religious Freedom
Protection Act attempted a half-hearted and ambiguous
codification of what interests it considered to be compelling. In
its findings, the legislature specified that "[ifn certain
circumstances, courts have found health, safety,
antidiscrimination, and other concerns to constitute compelling
133. See infra notes 13648 and accompanying text Professor Volokh offers that
courts should be more inclined to grant exemptions under state RFRAs than
under the Free Exercise Clause, because exemptions under the latter represent the
court's own values and are not subject to legislative revision. See Eugene Volokh,
Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions - A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21
CARDOZO L. REv. 595, 617-18 (1999).
134. In crafting a provision detailing which interests are and are not
compelling, the legislature should not limit itself to the interests at issue in the
Supreme Court's Free Exercise cases. As the California legislature recognized, the
courts have had occasion to apply the compelling interest test "in case law
relating to religious liberty and other fundamental rights." Cal. A. 1617 § 1(a)
(emphasis added). The compelling government interest standard also has been
used in the area of equal protection to evaluate governmental regulations
providing differential treatment based on racial classifications. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race,
whether or not its asserted purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign."'); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (In the context of affirmative action, racial
classifications must be "supported by a compelling state purpose,] and ... the
means chosen to accomplish that purpose [must be] .. . narrowly tailored.");
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citation omitted) (Classifications of
persons according to race "are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass
constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be 'necessary to the accomplishment' of their legitimate
purpose."). Additionally, strict scrutiny has been applied in the area of free
speech.to justify content-based regulations of speech. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("[Tlhe most exacting scrutiny [is applied] to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content."); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (holding that regulation of speech on government
property that has traditionally been available for public expression is subject to
highest scrutiny); Sable Comm. of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding
that although sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by
the free speech provision of the First Amendment, "[t]he Government may ...
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("[W]hen
speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.").
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governmental interests."'35 The General Assembly offered
further findings concerning how the act was to balance
governmental interests in the health, welfare, and safety of
children,136 in maintaining the security and safety of
correctional facilities, 1 7 and in public safety, peace, order, and
welfare embodied in criminal statutes.13
8
A recent proposal to amend the Illinois Religious Freedom
Restoration Act contains a more conclusive definition of
compelling governmental interest. The bill provides:
"Compelling governmental interest" includes but is not
limited to protecting the public health, safety and welfare;
promoting the efficient and effective administration of
policies, projects and programs, the use of public property,
or the enforcement of laws; protecting the legal and civil
rights of all persons; preserving public resources; preserving
the character of communities and neighborhoods; and
protecting property values.139
Although constructing a comprehensive definition for the
compelling interest test may be a worthy goal, state legislatures
looking to maximize protection for religious rights of minority
faiths should not mirror this Illinois proposal. While
commendable in its ambition, the Illinois definition of
"compelling" is flawed in its execution.
First, the proposed Illinois definition is rife with ambiguity
that could gut the guarantees of liberty codified by the
Religious Freedom Act. For example, the government's interest
in preserving public resources could be read narrowly to
include areas of environmental concern, or it could be
construed broadly to include welfare benefits and other public
funds. In addition, the definition provides no limitations on
what interests could be subsumed within the category of public
health, safety, and welfare. Liberally construed, the Illinois
135. Cal. A. 1617 § 3(a)(7).
136. See id. § 3(a)(9).
137. See id. § 3(a)(10).
138. See id. § 3(a)(11).
139. S. 0532, 91st Leg. § 5 (Ill. 1999). The proposed amendment, which has not
moved beyond the Rules Committee, is part of a larger effort to dilute the
protection of religious liberty created by the Illinois Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. The amendment narrows the circumstances under which
government may be deemed to have burdened the exercise of religion. See id. The
proposal also substitutes a "not substantially broader than necessary" test for the
no least restrictive alternative requirement of the act. Id. § 15.
[Vol. 23444
A Blessing in Disguise
definition endorses an unbounded range of interests as
compelling, allowing almost any government burden on
religious exercise to survive constitutional attack. Thus,
Illinois' comprehensive definition may in effect advance, rather
than restrict, the government's ability to discriminate on the
basis of religion.
Second, if interpreted in its broadest sense, the Illinois
definition labels as compelling those governmental interests
that landmark United States Supreme Court Free Exercise
decisions have held are not compelling.'4 ° While the Illinois
legislature contends in its proposed definition that preserving
public resources is a compelling state interest, the Supreme
Court consistently has held that the protection of welfare funds
against fraud and overpayment is not compelling so as to
warrant infringement of an individual's free exercise rights. 4'
In Sherbert v. Verner,142 the case most prominently cited in
state religious freedom acts for its interpretation of the
compelling interest test, a Sabbatarian was denied
unemployment compensation benefits because she refused to
work on Saturday, the day of her Sabbath.143  Because
Sherbert's disqualification from public benefits ultimately
forced her to choose between fidelity to her religious beliefs
and the cessation of her employment, the Court found that the
state had imposed a substantial burden on Sherbert's free
exercise rights. 44  To justify this infringement, the state
maintained that allowing religious exemptions would lead to
the filing of fraudulent claims, which would in turn dilute the
unemployment compensation fund. 4' The Court observed,
140. Analysis of free speech jurisprudence reveals an additional contradiction
with respect to the proposed compelling interest of preserving the character of
communities and neighborhoods. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54
(1994) (city's interest in minimizing visible clutter held insufficient to justify ban
on residential signs because such an ordinance "totally foreclosed that medium to
political, religious, or personal messages"); Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655 (8th
Cir. 1996) (city's interest in protecting residential privacy and tranquility held not
compelling to uphold residential picketing ordinance).
141. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't. of Employment
Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
142. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
143. See id. at 399-401.
144. See id. at 403-04.
145. See id. at 407.
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however, that the likelihood of feigned religious objections
hypothesized by the state was unsubstantiated by the record,
which indicated that only one other Sabbatarian had failed to
find a job which did not require work on Saturday.'46 Finding
that the government's interest in protecting its welfare funds
was not compelling, the Court held that the state could not
constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to Sherbert. 4 r
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division,'8 the Court again refused to hold that the interest in
protecting welfare funds outweighed the burden placed on an
individual's free exercise of religion. In Thomas, a Jehovah's
Witness was denied unemployment compensation benefits
after he terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade
his participation in the production of armaments.'49 Employing
the same analysis used in Sherbert, the Court concluded that the
state's interest in preserving welfare dollars was not
"sufficiently compelling to justify the burden upon Thomas'
religious liberty" and awarded Thomas benefits? 0 In support
of this conclusion, the Court observed that there was no
evidence in the record to indicate that the number of people
who hold religious beliefs that would cause them to leave their
jobs was large enough to seriously affect unemployment, much
less create widespread unemployment.'"'
Both Thomas and Sherbert illustrate that the government's
interest in protecting its welfare funds is not compelling absent
sufficient evidence that the accommodation of religious
exemptions would threaten the viability of the welfare
program. Consequently, state religious liberty acts should not
include the preservation of public resources as a government
interest that by its mere assertion is compelling.
Illinois's inclusion of program efficiency and administrative
effectiveness as compelling government interests also
contradicts settled Supreme Court doctrine. While no free
exercise case has dealt directly with this issue, the Supreme
Court, as well as some lower courts, have held administrative
146. See id. at 399 n.2.
147. See id. at 407.
148. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
149. See id. at 709.
150. Id. at 719.
151. See id.
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efficiency to be an insufficient reason to justify abridgement of
other fundamental liberties. 2 Justice Brennan suggested in his
dissenting opinion in Braunfeld v. Brown'53 that the impairment
of administrative convenience is not a compelling government
interest that may be relied upon to constitutionalize
deprivations of religious liberty." This notion finds further
support in Sherbert, where the Court rejected the government's
assertion that it had a compelling interest in preventing the
disruption of employers' scheduling practices. 5 Because the
Court has held that administrative efficiency is not a
compelling government interest, state religious freedom acts
should exclude administrative efficiency from the catalog of
interests labeled compelling under the act.
Not only does the Illinois definition mistakenly include
interests that are not compelling; it omits one important
interest that the Supreme Court always has deemed
compelling-government's interest in administering tax
programs.156 In United States v. Lee,'57 the Supreme Court held
152. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974)
("[A]dministrative convenience alone is insufficient to make valid what otherwise
is a violation of due process of law."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690
(1973) ("'[Aldministrative convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of
which dictates constitutionality."); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.. 147, 164
(1939) (holding that an ordinance barring distribution of handbills, though an
efficient and convenient way of preventing fraud, violates individual's free speech
rights); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 417 (1st Cir. 1977) (" [T]he denial of a
fundamental right or use of a suspect category cannot be justified by reference to
cost or convenience.").
Notably in Bowen v. Roy, the Court found that a social security number
requirement was essential for the smooth running of the welfare program, but it
did not go as far as to hold that such efficiency was a compelling concern. See
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 709 (1986) ("The social security number requirement
clearly promotes a legitimate and important public interest [in detecting and
preventing welfare fraud]." (emphasis added)).
153. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
154. See id. at 615-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court, in my view, has
exalted administrative convenience to a constitutional level high enough to justify
making one religion economically disadvantageous.").
155. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,407 (1963).
156. In addition to tax cases, the Court has consistently found military interests
sufficiently compelling to justify governmental impingement on an individual's
free exercise interests. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Court
upheld a conscription law denying exemptions for those opposed to a particular
war for religious reasons. In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), the Court
upheld an Air Force regulation that barred an ordained rabbi from wearing a
yarmulke while on duty because of the military's interest in maintaining
obedience and uniformity. Interestingly, Goldman was later overruled by a federal
statute, 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988), which provided an exemption for religious apparel.
157. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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that there is a compelling government interest in assuring
mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to
the social security system.58 In rejecting the Amish taxpayer's
claim that the Free Exercise Clause commands exemption from
social security tax obligations, the Court found that "the tax
system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a
manner that violates their religious belief."" 9 Because granting
tax exemptions would compromise the integrity and fairness of
the tax system, the Court held that the social security tax must
be uniformly applicable to citizens of all faiths.160 Accordingly,
state legislatures should acknowledge the protection of tax
programs as a compelling state interest when drafting their
religious freedom statutes.
While defining what interests are compelling may be a
laudable goal, there are some government interests that resist
pigeonholing. Given that the courts' rulings on the corapelling
nature of the government's interest in education and public
welfare are so dependent on the facts of the particular case, it
would be difficult to uniformly include or exclude these
interests in any definition of "compelling."
The courts' education decisions have been highly controlled
by the facts of each case. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,'6' the Supreme
Court held that the government's interest in establishing and
maintaining an educational system for its citizens was not
sufficiently compelling to force the Amish to send their
children to school beyond the eighth grade. 62 In Yoder, the
children had already learned basic reading, writing, and
158. See id. at 258-59.
159. Id. at 260.
160. See id. at 261. A long line of cases following Lee reaffirm the government's
compelling interest in ensuring a sound tax system. See Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (adopting Lee's rationale to uphold the
disallowance of income tax deductions for payments made to the Church of
Scientology for auditing and training sessions); South Ridge Baptist Church v.
Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Lee to support
state requirement of mandatory participation in workers' compensation program);
Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to exempt religious
objector from self-employment social security taxes on the grounds that such an
allowance would threaten the integrity of the tax system).
161. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
162. See id. at 234. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
that state compulsory education law was an unreasonable interference with the
liberty of the parents to direct the upbringing of their children).
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mathematics and would continue receiving informal vocational
education from their parents.' 63 Under these circumstances, the
Court determined that accommodating the Amish religious
objections by forgoing one or two additional years of
compulsory education would not impair the physical or mental
health of the children.'" The Court was quick to emphasize,
however, that because of the distinctive nature of the facts in
most educational disputes, religious exemptions should be
handled on a case-by-case basis:
[C]ourts are not school boards or legislatures, and are
ill-equipped to determine the "necessity" of discrete aspects
of a State's program of compulsory education. This should
suggest that courts must move with great circumspection in
performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a
State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious
claims for exemption from generally applicable educational
requirements.165
For these reasons, the Yoder Court limited its holding to
situations where a religious sect has proven that high school
attendance was contrary to their faith and that there were
adequate alternative modes of vocational education available to
their children.16
6
Where the unique circumstances from Yoder are lacking,
some lower courts have reached a different conclusion. 67 For
example, in Fleischfresser v. Directors of School District 200,168
parents claimed that an elementary school's supplemental
reading program, which included works of fantasy and
make-believe, prevented them from meeting their religious
163. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
164. See id. at 229.
165. Id. at 235.
166. See id.
167. See Fleischfresser v. Directors. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994);
Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding standardized test
requirement for home school students because government had compelling
interest in educating all of its citizens); St. Agnes v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D.
Md. 1990) (holding that satisfactory physician education was a compelling interest
to justify the requirement that religious hospitals teach all residents how to
perform abortions). But see Rader v. Johnson, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996)
(holding that a college's interest in promoting tolerance among students, fostering
diversity, and enhancing students' education with parietal rule of mandatory
on-campus housing for freshmen was legitimate, but not sufficiently compelling
to justify infringement of student's right to live in an off-campus Christian
housing facility).
168. 15 F.3d 680.
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obligation to teach specific Christian values to their children.169
The court determined, however, that the program was
designed to teach those skills of reading, creativity, and
imagination that are fundamental to children of such a young
age. 7 ° Unlike the children in Yoder then, these elementary
school children had yet to undergo the basic instruction
necessary for modem life. Therefore, the court held that the
government's interest in providing a well-rounded education
was sufficient to override the burden on the parents' free
exercise of their religion.'7'
In comparing Yoder and Fleischfresser, it becomes apparent
that a minor change in the facts can drastically affect the
outcome of a case. In one instance, a child's education may be
a compelling concern, while in another instance, it is not. Thus
a state legislature that wishes to comprehensively define what
interests are compelling in its religious freedom act cannot
uniformly include or exclude education from that definition.
Other aspects of public welfare that the Supreme Court has
addressed under the compelling interest test pose further
difficulties in crafting a fixed definition of "compelling." 172 In
some instances, the Court has held that the state's interest in
promoting the general welfare trumps the individual's
religious beliefs. For example, in Reynolds v. United States,173 the
Court held that criminal laws against polygamy could be
constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded
the practice.174 Because the very sanctity of marriage and
family was threatened, the Court concluded that the
government had a compelling interest in safeguarding the
nation from immorality.7 The Court held in Prince v.
169. See id. at 689.
170. See id. at 690.
171. See id.
172. Even assuming the government has a compelling interest in a particular
area of public welfare, the Court will not uphold a law where the government
restricts only religious conduct. For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993), the Court invalidated a ritual slaughter
statute despite the government's interest in protecting public health and
preventing cruelty to animals because the government failed to "enact feasible
measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm of the same sort."
173. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
174. See id. at 166.
175. See id. at 165.
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Massachusetts76 that the government's interest in the health and
well-being of children justified a statutory ban on the public
sale of religious literature by minor members of the Jehovah's
Witness.'1 In Braunfeld v. Brown,178 an Orthodox Jew claimed
that a state Sunday closing law burdened persons whose
religious tenets compelled them to refrain from work on other
days. 79 The Court upheld the statute, however, finding that
the allowance of exemptions would undermine the state's
compelling interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all
its workers.' The Court's opinion in each of these cases
supports the proposition that "legislative power ... may reach
people's actions when they are found to be in violation of
important social duties or subversive of good order, even when
the actions are demanded by one's religion."1
8
'
In contrast, there have been many instances where the
Supreme Court has refused to permit the infringement of an
individual's religious rights even where the state claimed an
interest in protecting public health, welfare, or safety. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 82 Jehovah's
Witnesses were expelled from school for refusing to comply
with a West Virginia regulation that required all public school
children to salute the American flag.Y3 To justify the statute,
the state proffered a compelling interest in bolstering national
unity and citizenship among its youth.' The Court, however,
enjoined enforcement of the statute, finding the regulations
relatively trivial to the welfare of the nation.'85 Similarly, in
Torcaso v. Watkins, 86 the state attempted to ensure the veracity
and trustworthiness of notaries public, and in part the security
of the Nation, by requiring all appointed officials to declare a
176. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
177. See id. at 168-70.
178. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
179. See id. at 601-02.
180. See id. at 608-09.
181. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
182. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
183. See id. at 629-30.
184. See id. at 626 n.2. The statute was passed "'for the purpose of teaching,
fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism, and
increasing the knowledge of the organization and machinery of the government."
Id. at 625 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 174 (1941 Supp.)).
185. See id. at 642.
186. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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belief in God.187  The Court invalidated the religious test
requirement, holding that the asserted state interest was not
compelling enough to force a person to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. 8
As these additional cases demonstrate, the protection of
public welfare cannot universally be included in or excluded
from any comprehensive definition of the compelling interest
test.189 Rather than uniformly declaring whether the interest in
protecting public health, safety, and welfare is compelling, the
Court has examined the precise facts on a case-by-case basis.
With the assessment of the strength of the governmental
interest in public welfare so fact-determinative, it is improbable
that a definition of "compelling" could be drafted with enough
specificity to properly address all possible scenarios.
While the Illinois legislature is to be commended for
attempting to define the compelling interest test, there are
obvious flaws in its approach. The overbreadth, contradictions,
and inconsistencies of the proposed definition would work to
undermine the goal of providing a more protective statutory
remedy for minority faiths. More specifically, the
all-encompassing definition of what interests are compelling in
essence legislates the Smith Court's rational basis test,
exempting a religious objector from a rule of general
applicability only where no governmental interest could be
imagined to support the requirement.
187. See id. at 490.
188. See id. at495.
189. Additional support for this proposition can be found beyond the scope of
the Free Exercise Clause. What constitutes a compelling state interest in the area
of public health, welfare, and safety remains an unsettled issue among the courts
under the Free Speech Clause as well. Compare Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
519 U.S. 357 (1997) (holding that the government's interest in ensuring public
safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic, and protecting property rights
were significant enough to uphold injunction against protestors' activities outside
abortion clinics), and Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727 (1996) (holding that the government's interest in protecting children from
exposure to indecent material justified a federal provision permitting cable
television operators to prohibit indecent programming on leased channels), will
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the State's interest in
preserving the American flag as symbol of nationhood and national unity could
not justify defendant's conviction for violation of the Texas flag desecration
statute), and Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
(holding that the State's interest in protecting charities and the public from fraud
was not compelling to justify requirement that professional fundraisers obtain
license to solicit funds).
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Under closer analysis, there does not seem to be a simple
way of defining the compelling interest test.'90 The inability to
craft a comprehensive interest of which interests are
compelling, however, should not induce state legislatures to
mimic the United States Congress's incorporation of pre-Smith
case law. For to do so invites the claim that the state legislature
is impermissibly attempting to construe the Free Exercise
Clause contrary to the interpretation mandated by the United
States Supreme Court. Perhaps the instruction of the Texas and
California legislatures to treat Supreme Court decisions as
persuasive authority is the best solution to the Hobson's choice
of on the one hand offering no guidance to the state courts
charged with interpreting the religious freedom act, or on the
other hand leaving the act vulnerable to a constitutional
challenge by adopting pre-Smith cases as the governing
standard. Beyond this general instruction, however, state
legislatures are well-advised to offer more concrete advice as to
how the compelling interest test applies in two discrete
situations-enforcement of statutes barring discrimination and
prisoner claims.
b. State Religious Freedom Acts Should Prescribe under What
Circumstances Prevention of Discrimination Will Be Deemed to Be a
Compelling Governmental Interest.
Although it may be impossible to draft a comprehensive
definition of what governmental interests will and will not be
deemed compelling, the state religious freedom act should
specifically address one state interest-the prevention of
discrimination. The lower federal courts have divided over
when the government's interest in eradicating discrimination is
sufficiently compelling to justify burdens on religion. Rather
than incorporate these unsettled precedents, the state religious
freedom act should make explicit its intended effect on extant
anti-discrimination laws.
190. See Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 133, at 618.
It would be nice if someone could define what makes an interest
'compelling."' But this is a tall order. The Court has never precisely
defined this term in any of the contexts in which strict scrutiny has been
applied, and the word might be too complex for any nontautological
definition to be created.
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In two cases, the United States Supreme Court has found the
government's interest in eliminating discrimination to be
compelling. In Bob Jones University v. United States,"' the Court
upheld the Internal Revenue Service ruling that denied tax-
exempt status to private schools with racially discriminatory
admissions policies. The Court rejected the claim that the
ruling violated the Free Exercise Clause of the United States
Constitution when applied to schools whose discrimination is a
product of sincerely held religious beliefs. The government's
interest in eliminating the vestiges of race discrimination in
education, the Court found, was compelling and could not be
achieved by less restrictive means.' 92
The Court also has held that prevention of gender
discrimination is a compelling interest sufficient to justify
restrictions on freedom of expression. In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,193 the Court determined that the Minnesota Human
Rights Act did not violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution when it
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members.
The Court conceded that the Act infringed upon the Jaycees'
collective freedom to speak and to petition the government for
the redress of grievances. This right to associate for expressive
purposes, however, is not absolute; government may limit the
freedom if it proffers a compelling interest that cannot be
achieved by alternatives less restrictive of association.194 The
Court then held that the aims of sweeping away discrimination
against women and assuring equal access to publicly available
goods and services were "compelling state interests of the
highest order,"'95 and could not be satisfied by means less
restrictive than requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full
voting members. 6
The lower courts, however, have not consistently
synthesized Bob Jones and Roberts to dictate that the
191. 461 U.S. 574 (1982).
192. See id. at 604. In an accompanying footnote, the Court made clear that its
holding was limited to the government's goal of eradicating race discrimination in
religious schools, but did not extend to churches or other purely religious
institutions not engaged in the enterprise of education. See id. at 604 n.29.
193. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
194. See id. at 623.
195. Id. at 624.
196. See id. at 626-27.
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government's interest in eradicating discrimination is
universally compelling. To the contrary, in Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission,'97 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that laws adopted by the State of Alaska and City
of Anchorage to prevent discrimination in rental housing could
not constitutionally be applied to landlords whose Christian
religious beliefs prevented them from renting to unmarried
cohabitants. 98 In assessing whether the anti-discrimination
laws invaded free exercise under the First Amendment, the
court utilized strict scrutiny because it found that the landlords
asserted a hybrid rights claim;' 9 the landlords not only averred
that they had been deprived of their right to freedom of
religion but also raised colorable claims that the laws infringed
their Fifth Amendment right to exclude others from their
property as well as their First Amendment rights to free
speech.
The court of appeals ruled that the government's interest in
outlawing discrimination on the basis of marital status was not
compelling and thus the landlords were entitled to an
exemption from the anti-discrimination laws. The court
interpreted Bob Jones and Roberts as holding the states' interest
in eradicating discrimination to be compelling only where there
is a "firm national policy" against the discrimination at issue.2 °
Unlike race and gender discrimination, the court reasoned,
there is no evidence of a national policy against discrimination
on the basis of marital status. Neither the Supreme Court nor
any lower federal court utilized heightened scrutiny in
assessing claims of marital status discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.201
Furthermore, the Supreme Court had declined to find a
substantive due process right of unrelated persons to live
197. 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999).
198. The landlords believed that cohabitation between individuals who are not
married was the sin of fornication. Were the landlords to rent to unmarried
individuals, they would be enabling cohabitation and thereby facilitating sin. See
id. at 696.
199. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
200. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 692.
201. See id. at 715. By contrast, the court noted, the Supreme Court has applied
more than rational basis review to Equal Protection claims based upon race and
gender. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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together. 2 Rather than evidence a legislative policy against
marital-status discrimination, the court of appeals reasoned,
the federal Fair Housing Act as well as other federal civil rights
laws do not include marital status among the prohibited
categories of discrimination.2 3 Because the government's goal
of barring discrimination against the unmarried was not
compelling, the application of the state and local anti-
discrimination ordinances to religious objectors violated the
Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution.2°
202. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 715 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977)).
203. See id. at 716. The court refused to find that Alaska statutes outlawing such
discrimination establish a compelling governmental interest of federal
constitutional magnitude. To do so, the court argued, would permit states by
statute to opt out of federal constitutional rules. See id. In any event, Alaska law
permitted discrimination against unmarried persons in other contexts.
204. The handful of state courts that have considered whether prevention of
marital-status discrimination is compelling have divided over the issue. Compare
State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (plurality opinion) (holding that
because the state's interest in eradicating discrimination in rental housing on the
basis 'of marital status was not compelling under the Minnesota Constitution, a
landlord could not be found in violation of the state Human Rights Act on
account of his religiously based refusal to rent to an unmarried couple) and
Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994) ("Without
supporting facts in the record or in legislative findings, we are unwilling to
conclude that simple enactment of the prohibition against discrimination based on
marital status establishes that the State has such a substantial interest in
eliminating that form of housing discrimination that, on a balancing test, the
substantial burden on the defendant's free exercise of religion must be
disregarded.") with McCready v. Hoffus, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998) (holding
that equal access to housing regardless of marital status is a compelling
governmental interest) and Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d
274, 282 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979 (1994) (holding that the
government's interests in providing access to housing for all and preventing acts
of discrimination were "of the highest order"). See also Smith v. Fair Employment
and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1966) (finding it unnecessary to resolve
whether interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of marital status was
compelling because requiring compliance with anti-discrimination act does not
burden exercise of religion under RFRA).
The Swanner court applied the less rigorous Smith test in rejecting the landlord's
claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. See
Swanner, 874 P.2d at 279-80. In a footnote, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that
just before publication of its opinion, Congress passed RFRA. Assuming that
RFRA was constitutional and applied to the case, the court observed, the outcome
would not be affected because of the court's holding that under the state
constitution the government's interest is compelling and there are no less
restrictive alternatives to meeting the desired ends. See id. at 280 n.9. Justice
Thomas dissented from the Supreme Court's denial of a writ of certiorari in
Swanner. See Swarmer v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that the government's interest in
protecting against discrimination on the basis of marital status was not
compelling under RFRA because of the absence of any firm national policy
barring such discrimination in housing. See Swanner, 513 U.S. at 981.
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The potential for courts to subordinate the state's interest in
eradicating discrimination to religious exercise may not be
limited to marital status. If the Thomas court's analysis is
followed, prevention of discrimination will be deemed not
compelling whenever there is no "firm national policy"
protecting the particular class.05 If the courts adopt the Thomas
instruction to discern national policy by examining whether
heightened scrutiny is afforded under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution, discrimination on the
basis of sexual preference may not be deemed compelling.2°6 In
withdrawing its support for the proposed federal Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1999,207 the American Civil Liberties
Union observed that "[b]ecause sexual orientation, marital
status, disability, and other newly protected classes currently
do not receive the same level of scrutiny as race and sex.., it
may be more difficult to persuade all courts that the
governmental interest in preventing discrimination on these
grounds is compelling."2" Representatives Berman, Nadler,
Lee, and Delahunt filed a dissenting view to the House report
on RLPA because as drafted, RLPA "could be used by some as
a sword to attack the rights of many Americans, including
unmarried couples, single parents, lesbians and gays."2'
205. The Thomas court found state statutes proiecting the class to be irrelevant
to the determination of whether there is a national policy barring discrimination
against the class of persons protected by that state law. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at
716. It may be argued that the Thomas analysis should not apply to state, as
opposed to federal, statutes legislating the compelling interest test. The Thomas
court rejected consideration of state statutes because states are not empowered to
opt out of federal rights. See id. Obviously this Supremacy Clause issue is not
presented where state anti-discrimination statutes are consulted to aid in
interpretation of other state, as opposed to federal, statutes. On the other hand,
where the state religious freedom act incorporates pre-Smith federal constitutional
cases, the analysis becomes cloudier, lending further support to the proposition
that the legislature should resolve the stature to be afforded anti-discrimination
laws on the face of the religion freedom act.
206. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (ipplying rational basis to Equal
Protection challenge to amendment to Colorado Constitution prohibiting
protected status based upon homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation and
finding that the amendment failed that standard); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (holding that a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy does not violate
the fundamental right of homosexuals under the federal Constitution).
207. See Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
208. Id. at 7.
209. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 40 (1999). See also 145 CONG. REC. H5589 (daily
ed. July 15,1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler):
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Most of the state religious freedom acts that have been
enacted are silent as to the interface between the compelling
interest test and state or local anti-discrimination laws. The
failure to specify under what circumstances the prevention of
discrimination is a compelling interest invites unpredictable
results as future courts adjudicate religious-based claims to
exemption from state civil rights laws proscribing
discrimination. 210 Given the unsettled state of the law as to
whether prevention of discrimination on grounds other than
race or gender is a compelling governmental interest, the
ambiguity is heightened rather than resolved where the
legislature simply instructs that its intent is to incorporate pre-
Smith precedents.
There are several ways in which the legislature may express
its intended resolution of the conflict between religious liberty
and the state's interest in eliminating discrimination. First, if
the legislature wishes blanket insurance that the rights of all
persons who are protected by the state's anti-discrimination
laws take primacy over persons whose religion dictates that
they be entitled to discriminate, the act can be drafted to make
clear that the religious freedom act does not affect rights under
the state's civil rights laws. For example, the vetoed California
Religious Freedom Protection Act provided, "Nothing in this
act shall be construed to alter the existing balance between
religious liberty claims and other civil and constitutional rights.
The bill as drafted would enable the CEO of a large corporation to say, my
religion prohibits me from letting my corporation hire a divorced person or a
disabled person or a mother who should be at home with her children and not
at work or a gay or lesbian person and my religion prohibits me from letting
my hotel rent a room to any such people.
Id.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund likewise opposed RLPA because
it "would require individuals and groups proceeding under... state and local
anti-discrimination laws to prove that the law they wish to utilize is a least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest." Id. at H5590
(letter of Elaine R. Jones, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc. to Rep. Conyers).
210. See Christopher E. Anders & Rose A. Saxe, Effect of a Statutory Religious
Freedom Strict Scrutiny Standard on the Enforcement of State and Local Civil Rights
Laws, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 663, 666 (1999) ("[W]ithout any further amendments,
RLPA could potentially jeopardize certain civil rights claims in at least some
states, and will increase the litigation costs for civil rights plaintiffs even for those
claims where a RLPA defense would be unsuccessful.'). But see Robert M. O'Neil,
Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 23
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785 (1999) (arguing that exemptions from state RFRAs for anti-
bias laws are unnecessary and unwise).
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No inference should be drawn that... the Legislature intends
to further discrimination." 1'
Alternatively, the legislature may prefer to tailor the precise
circumstances under which the anti-discrimination laws do and
do not trump rights newly created by the state religious
freedom act. The Texas Religious Freedom Act includes a
general provision that the legislation "does not establish or
eliminate a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution
under a federal or state civil rights law."21 2  The Act then
prescribes the following exception to the primacy of state civil
rights laws:
[The Texas Religious Freedom Act] is fully applicable to
claims regarding the employment, education, or
volunteering of those who perform duties, such as spreading
or teaching faith, performing devotional services, or internal
governance, for a religious organization. For the purposes of
this subsection, an organization is a religious organization if:
(1) the organization's primary purpose and function are
religious, it is a religious school organized primarily for
religious and educational purposes, or it is a religious
charity organized primarily for religious and charitable
purposes; and
(2) it does not engage in activities that would disqualify
it from tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3),
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as it existed on August
30,1999.213
Representative Nadler similarly proposed an amendment to
RLPA that limited the class of persons who could invoke the
Act's protection to secure dispensation from anti-
discrimination laws. Religious exemptions from laws
prohibiting discrimination in housing could be granted only to
small landlords exempt under the federal Fair Housing Act.214
RLPA would sanction religiously-founded discrimination in
211. A. 1617, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 1998) (vetoed). Later in the Act,
however, the legislature muddied the waters by prescribing that "Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to require that religious liberty claims always prevail
over, or always be subordinate to, other civil or constitutional rights." Id.
212. TEX. CW. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.011(a) (West 1999).
213. Id. § 110.011(b).
214. See 145 CoNG. REc. H5597 (daily ed. July 15, 1999). "A person who may
raise a claim or defense.., is (1) an owner of a dwelling described in section
803(b) of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3603(b)), with respect to a prohibition
relating to discrimination in housing." Id.
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employment only where the business employs five or fewer
individuals or is a church, religious school, or other religious
institution.25 The House rejected the Nadler amendment by a
vote of 234 to 190.216
Regardless of what particular balance between prevention of
discrimination and religious liberty the legislature wishes to
craft, the blind adoption of pre-Smith case law cannot be relied
upon to achieve the desired weighing of competing interests.217
c. Incorporating Pre-Smith Cases Creates Ambiguity as to the
Standard to Be Applied to Prisoner Cases
Apart from the constitutional problems posed and the
unknown effect on discrimination created if a state religious
freedom act incorporates pre-Smith cases, referencing pre-Smith
decisions of the federal courts also renders the state act
ambiguous when applied to prisoner free exercise claims. To
avoid such ambiguity, the statute instead should define the
precise standard that the legislature intends to apply to claimed
invasions of religious liberty of persons incarcerated in state
and local penal institutions.
In a pair of cases decided three years before Smith, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the compelling interest/no less
restrictive alternatives test was not to apply to incursions on
federal constitutional rights of inmates.21" In Turner v. Safley,219
the Court defined the general standard governing
constitutional claims of prison inmates. Turner arose out of
215. RLPA affords rights "with respect to a prohibition against discrimination
in employment" to
(A) a, religious corporation, association, educational institution (as
described in 42 U.S.C. 20OOe-2(e)), or society, with respect to the
employment of individuals who perform duties such as spreading or
teaching faith, other instructional functions, performing or assisting in
devotional services, or activities relating to the internal governance of
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society in the
carrying on of its activities; or (B) an entity employing 5 or fewer
individuals.
Id.
216. See id. at H5607.
217. The state religious liberty act also may have to resolve whether denying
religious exemptions from anti-discrimination laws is the least restrictive means
of satisfying the compelling interest. See Anders & Saxe, supra note 210, at 673-75.
218. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342
(1987).
219. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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challenges to Missouri Division of Corrections regulations that
limited correspondence between prisoners and restricted
inmate marriages. The district court, applying strict scrutiny,
struck down the regulations because they were not the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the government's interest in
security and rehabilitation.' The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court's application of strict scrutiny to the claims as well
as its finding that the government had failed to satisfy the least
restrictive alternative prong of the inquiry.2 '
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the lower courts
had used the wrong standard in assessing whether the
regulations violated the inmates' constitutional rights. The
Court held that under its precedents dating back to 1974, a
prison regulation does not offend the federal Constitution if the
regulation is "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." 22 The Court reasoned that strict scrutiny would
unduly hinder prison administrators' flexibility and innovation
in addressing security and other problems endemic to
managing a correctional institution. Combing every decision to
determine whether there are less restrictive alternatives to
meeting the prison's needs, the Court asserted, would
"'unnecessarily perpetuate the involvement of the federal
courts in affairs of prison administration.' "' 2
Eight days after it issued its decision in Turner, the Court in
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz2 24 held that alleged deprivations of
an inmate's free exercise of religion likewise would not be
evaluated under the compelling interest/no less restrictive
alternatives standard. Islamic prisoners in the Leesburg State
Prison challenged the policy that prohibited inmates assigned
to outside work details from returning to the prison during the
day except in the event of an emergency. The effect of the
policy was to preclude Muslims ordered to work outside the
prison from attending the weekly Muslim congregational
service known as Jumu'ah, which in accordance with the Koran
was required to be held after the sun reached its zenith but
220. See Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
221. See Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985).
222. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
223. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,407 (1974)).
224. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
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before the afternoon prayer.225
The district court concluded that the policy did not violate
the Constitution because the ban on returning to the prison
from work detail "plausibly advanced" the interest of security,
order, and rehabilitation.22 6  The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court had applied an unduly lenient standard in evaluating the
government's justification for limiting the prisoners' religious
rites. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court to consider whether the state could demonstrate that the
regulations were
intended to serve, and do serve, the important penological
goal of security, and that no reasonable method exists by
which [prisoners'] religious rights can be accommodated
without creating bona fide security problems.... Where it is
found that reasonable methods of accommodation can be
adopted without sacrificing either the state's interest in
security or the prisoners' interest in freely exercising their
religious rights, the state's refusal to allow the observation of
a central religious practice cannot be justified and violates
the prisoner's first amendment rights.227
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals had erred
by mandating more exacting scrutiny than the test the Court
adopted in Turner. The Court ruled that burdens on an
inmate's religious liberty do not trammel federal constitutional
rights if the limitation is "'reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. ' "' This more deferential test applies
even where a prison regulation has the effect not only of
limiting a religious practice, but of prohibiting that practice.229
225. See id. at 345.
226. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 934 (D.N.J. 1984).
227. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416,420 (3d Cir. 1986).
228. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
229. See id. at 349 n.2. The Supreme Court identified four factors that are to be
considered in assessing whether a prison regulation satisfies the reasonableness
test- 1) whether there is a "'valid, rational connection' between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forth to justify it."; 2)
whether "there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open" to
the inmate; 3) the impact that accommodating the constitutional right will have on
guards, other inmates and the allocation of prison resources in general; and 4)
whether there arealternatives that accommodate the prisoner's religious liberty at
de minimus cost to penological goals. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91. The Court made
clear that the "absence of ready alternatives" factor is not the same as the "least
restrictive alternatives" test that controls where strict scrutiny is employed by the
courts. Id. These four factors continue to be applied by lower federal courts
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Under the appropriate test, the Court concluded, the policies
challenged in O'Lone passed constitutional muster.
State religious freedom acts that, through findings, statement
of purpose, or other means incorporate pre-Smith case law
while promulgating the compelling interest test are ambiguous
when applied to prisoner claims. If the goal of the legislature is
to mandate the compelling interest/no less restrictive
alternatives test to justify limitations on religious liberty of
prisoners, the legislature must intend that courts utilize a more
rigorous level of scrutiny than prescribed by the Supreme
Court's pre-Smith prisoner free exercise cases. On the other
hand, if the intent of the legislature is not to disturb the Turner-
O'Lone standard of review for prison cases, but to restore strict
scrutiny for burdens on non-prisoners created by rules of
general applicability, the establishment of an across-the-board
compelling interest/no less restrictive alternatives test
improperly posits a higher level of scrutiny than is intended to
be applied to prisoner cases.
Congress' failure to particularize the standard that was to
govern prisoner suits under RFRA spawned significant
litigation over the issue. The courts ultimately concluded that
Congress meant to expand the religious liberty of prisoners and
to apply the compelling interest test to prisoner claims under
RFRA.23° The courts' analysis was aided by the fact that even
though the language of the statute did not specifically state
whether RFRA was to apply to prisons," the legislative history
made plain that Congress intended to resurrect the compelling
interest test for prisoner claims. The Senate Report expressly
noted that the intent of the legislation was "to restore the
traditional protection afforded to prisoners to observe their
entertaining a claim that a prison policy or regulation invades the religious
freedom of inmates under the United States Constitution. See In re Long Term
Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 469-
70 (4th Cir. 1999); Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1999); Chirceol v.
Phillips, 169 F.3d 313,316 (5th Cir. 1999).
230. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468,475 (2d Cir. 1996); Hamilton v. Schiro, 74
F.3d 1545,1551-52 (8th Cir. 1996); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1995);
Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476,1479 (10th Cir. 1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d
948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
231. The courts, however, did rely upon the absence of any distinction between
prisoner and non-prisoner claims in the plain language of RFRA to conclude that
the compelling interest test is to apply to prisoner suits under the act. See Jolly, 76
F.3d at 475; Werner, 49 F.3d at 1479; Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 477 (D.
Ariz. 1995); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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religions which was weakened by the decision in O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz."232 The House Committee likewise accepted
that RFRA would govern prisoner claims.23  Furthermore,
Congress debated and rejected a proposed Senate amendment
that would have exempted inmate claims from RFRA.234
Regrettably most of the state religious freedom acts
incorporate pre-Smith cases without resolving the ambiguity
over whether the legislature intends to restore the compelling
interest test abandoned for prisoner claims in Turner and
O'Lone. 2 To preempt litigation over whether state religious
freedom acts mandate the compelling interest test for inmate
claims, state legislatures are well advised to answer the issue in
the text of the statute.
The dispute over whether a state religious freedom act
endorses the compelling interest/no less restrictive alternatives
test for inmate suits may be resolved in one of three ways.
First, the state may elect to wholly exempt prisoners from the
ambit of the act, thus affording no additional rights to prisoners
as a matter of state statutory law. For example, the Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act expressly "does not apply
to any person who is incarcerated in a penal institution or who
232. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899
(footnote omitted).
233. See H.R. REP. No. 103-88 (1993).
234. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9-11, 18-24, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1898-1901, 1906-12; 139 CONG. REC. S14,468 (1993). Although declining to exempt
prisoners from RFRA, the Senate Committee did "expect[ ] that the courts will
continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and expertise of
prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and
procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with
consideration of costs and limited resources." S. REP. No. 103-111, at 10, reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1898-1900. Courts relied upon this instruction when
applying the compelling interest test in the prison context. See Jolly, 76 F.3d at
476; Werner, 49 F.3d at 1476.
RLPA does not exempt prisoners from the Act. However, prisoner litigation
under RLPA is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See H.R. 1691,
106th Cong. § 4(c) (1999). The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996); provides for
pretrial dismissal of prisoner suits, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (1994 & Supp. II 1996);
limits prospective relief, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1998); precludes
recovery for mental and emotional injury suffered in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1994 & Supp. I11996); and limits
recovery of attorney's fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (1994 & Supp. II. 1996).
235. See, e.g., S. 1056, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-571(b) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-80.1-3; S. 644, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1999) (vetoed); A. 1617,1997-98
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (vetoed); S.B. 1394,55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2000).
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is in custody of an employee of a penal institution."2 3 6
Alternatively, the act may accomplish the same result by
prescribing the deferential O'Lone standard to govern prisoner
free exercise claims. The proposed amendment to the
Connecticut Religious Freedom Act provides that "[tihe
Department of Correction may burden the exercise of religion
of a person in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction
unless such person demonstrates that the application of the
burden to such person bears no reasonable relationship to the
furtherance of a legitimate penological interest.""3
Secondly, the statute may make clear that the compelling
interest/no less restrictive alternatives test is to apply equally
to claims brought by prisoners and non-prisoners. The South
Carolina Religious Freedom Act elaborates on how the
compelling interest/no less restrictive alternatives test is to be
applied to state and local prisons:
(A) A state or local correctional facility's regulation must be
considered "in furtherance of a compelling state interest" if
the facility demonstrates that the religious activity:
(1) sought to be engaged by a prisoner is presumptively
dangerous to the health or safety of that prisoner; or
(2) poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or security
of other prisoners, correctional staff, or the public;
(B) A state or local correctional facility regulation may not
be considered the "least restrictive means" of furthering a
compelling state interest if a reasonable accommodation can
be made to protect the safety or security of prisoners,
correctional staff, or the public.23
Under this approach, burdens on religious liberty of
prisoners will be subjected to strict scrutiny if challenged under
the state religious freedom act while the more deferential
standard will be employed to assess alleged infringements of
religious liberty brought under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Third, the state may opt to define a standard for prison cases
236. H.R. 2370,90th Leg. § 25(a) (Ii. 1998).
237. S. 983, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1999). The bill was referred to the Joint
Committee on the Judiciary and a public hearing was held on February 4, 1999.
The bill went no further and the legislative session ended June 9,1999.
238. H.R. 3158,113th Reg. Sess. § 2 (S.C. 1999).
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that is less rigorous than strict scrutiny but more demanding
than the reasonableness standard currently applied to prisoner
challenges based upon the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. For example, the Texas Religious Freedom Act
provides:
[A]n ordinance, rule, order, decision, or practice that applies
to a person in the custody of a municipal or county jail or
other correctional facility operated by or under a contract
with a county or municipality is presumed to be in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The
presumption may be rebutted. 239
The choice of standard is a political judgment based upon the
preferred balance between religious liberty, penological
objectives, and the degree to which the legislature desires the
courts to oversee or to defer to the judgment of prison
administrators.24 The failure to unambiguously express the
will of the legislature as to what level of scrutiny is to be
applied to invasions of religious freedom of prison inmates,
however, will generate unnecessary litigation and may lead the
courts to construe the religious freedom act in a way that the
legislature did not intend.
4. State Religious Freedom Acts Should Not Prescribe How the State
Constitution Is to Be Construed.
Beyond taking pains to avoid trammeling upon the province
of the United States Supreme Court, state legislatures also must
avoid infringements upon the power of the state judiciary that
statutory provisions declaring how courts are to interpret the
state constitution may cause. The Connecticut Act Concerning
Religious Freedom unwisely purports "to reiterate the
compelling interest test for freedom of religion claims under
the state constitution."24' The Act bars the state and its
239. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 361.101 (West 1999).
240. Compare Lee Boothby & Nicholas P. Miller, Prisoner Claims for Religious
Freedom and State RFRAs, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 573 (1999) and Isaac M. Jaroskiwiz,
How the Grinch Stole Chanukah, 21 CARDOZo L. REV. 707 (1999) (state RFRAs
should adopt strict scrutiny for prisoner claims of religious freedom) with David
Schwarz, Religious Liberty Protection Act: Impact on Religious Services in Prison, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 796 (1999) ("[I]f enacted, the Religious Liberty Protection
Act of 1998 ('RLPA') will produce a negative impact on the proper management,
equitable treatment, and good order of religious practices in prisons.").
241. 1993 Conn. Public Act No. 93-252.
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subdivisions from burdening "a person's exercise of religion
under section 3 of article first of the state constitution, even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless
the government demonstrates that the burden imposed is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
interest.2
42
State religious freedom statutes that dictate that the
compelling interest test be used to ev'aluate burdens on
religious rights under the state constitution spawn an
unnecessary constitutional conflict between the legislative and
judicial branches of the state government. At least one court
has repudiated the legislature's power to mandate by statute
how the courts are to construe the state constitution.243  In
Juhnkins v. Branstad,244 the Iowa legislature passed a bill that
defined the phrase "appropriation bill" for purposes of
construing the state constitutional provision regarding the
governor's veto power. Much as the United States Supreme
Court castigated Congress for attempting to tread upon the
powers of the federal judicial branch, the Iowa Supreme Court
condemned the Iowa legislature's arrogation of the state court's
power to interpret the state constitution:
Whatever purposes the legislative definition of
"appropriation bill" may serve, it does not settle the
constitutional question. In this case, determination of the
scope of the governor's authority granted by Article III,
section 16, as amended, will require a decision whether the
bill involved here was an "appropriation bill" as that term is
used in our constitution. This determination,
notwithstanding the legislative definition, is for the courts.245
Thus a state religious freedom act that instructs courts to
apply strict scrutiny to religious claims under the state
constitution risks suffering the same fate as Congress's
242. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(a) and (b) (West 1999). The statute
could be construed as using the state constitution to define when a person's
exercise of religion is burdened and as requiring compelling interest as a matter of
statutory rather than state constitutional right. The statement of purpose,
however, suggests that the aim of the statute was to mandate the compelling
interest test as a matter of state constitutional law.
243. See Juhnkins v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130 (Iowa 1988); see also Symposium,
Separation of Powers in State Constitutional Law, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (Fall
1998).
244. 421 N.W.2d 130 (Iowa 1988).
245. Id. at 135.
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mandate in RFRA2 4 6
Rather than insisting upon a construction of the state
constitution, a state legislature striving to protect minority
faiths should disassociate its newly-created statutory rights
from independent rights of religious liberty that may be
guaranteed by the state constitution. Several of the state
religious liberty acts include provisions clarifying that the
legislation does not pretend to guide interpretation of the
establishment of religion aspects of the state constitution.247
Only Texas, however, created the same institutional separation
between its religious freedom act and free exercise provisions
of the state constitution. The Texas legislature specified that its
religious freedom act "may not be construed to affect or
interpret [the religious liberty provisions of] Article I, Texas
Constitution. 248  Every state religious protection act should
include a comparable provision to ensure that the legislation is
not plagued by an unconstitutional incursion on the power of
the state judiciary.
246. See Gressman, Comedy, supra note 60, at 534-36 (outlining the risk that state
RFRAs will contravene state separation of powers doctrine). Somewhat more
muddled in their relation to state constitutions are the religious freedom acts
passed in Florida, Illinois and South Carolina. As part of the express findings
underlying the acts, the legislatures observe that free exercise of religion is an
"inalienable right" secured by the state constitution. Unlike the Connecticut
statute, however, these acts do not expressly prescribe that the compelling interest
test adopted in the statute is to be employed in evaluating religious freedom
claims under the state constitution. See H.B. 3201,1998 Leg. Sess., 100th Reg. Sess.
(Fl. 1998); H.B. 2370, 89th Reg. Leg. Sess. (11. 1997); H.B. 3158, 113th Reg. Sess.
(S.C. 1999). The Arizona and Idaho Acts also are ambiguous as to their impact on
interpretation of the state constitution. The legislatures specified that they were
exercising the police power "to establish statutory protections that codify and
supplement rights guaranteed by the [State] constitutions." S.B. 1391-441R-1 VER,
Section 2(A)(5), 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1999); S.B. 1394, 55th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Idaho 2000); see also A.B. 1617, § 3, Finding 4,1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998)
(vetoed). The legislature creates no conflict with the state judiciary when it
"supplements" rights provided by the state constitution;, the effort to "codify"
those rights, however, could be viewed as trespassing upon the judiciary's role in
interpreting the constitution. See Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the
New Illinois Religious Freedom Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LOYOLA U. CHIC. L.J.
153 (2000).
247. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 761.05(5) (West 1998); H.B. 2370, § 25(c), 89th Reg. Leg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); H.B.
3158, § 2,113th Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999).
248. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.009(b) (West 1999).
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5. State Religious Freedom Acts Do Not Contravene the
Establishment Clause
Beyond the two constitutional defects that haunted RFRA,
there is an additional constitutional hurdle that state religious
freedom acts must surmount. In his concurring opinion in
Boerne, Justice Stevens offered that RFRA violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause249  by codifying a
"governmental preference for religion.""0  The Court's
precedents, however, offer ample support for accommodation
of religious practices that do not offend the Establishment
Clause. Careful drafting of state religious freedom acts may
further shield the legislation from constitutional attack by
making plain that the act does not authorize exemptions from
general laws in circumstances that would contravene the
Establishment Clause.
Although the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
no model of consistency,"' the Court has been unwavering in
proclaiming that the attitude of the government toward
religion must be one of neutrality in order for a regulation to
pass constitutional muster.12 Only where the government has
exhibited hostility toward a specific religious group or has
favored or promoted religion have the courts been intolerant2-3
249. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion....").
250. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
251. The test for neutrality under the Establishment Clause has been in constant
flux. See Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional,
Modern, and Postmodern Religion in US. Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 50
n.6 (1999) (providing an overview of various tests used for Establishment Clause
analysis).
252. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987)
(citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("There is ample room
under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.") In
permitting religious accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court
also has recognized that extending an exemption from a general law "reflects no
more than the governmental obligation of neutrality, and does not represent that
involvement of religious with secular institutions which is the object of the
Establishment Clause to forestall." Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963));
see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-221 (1971).
253. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (requiring that where the
government makes its property available for meetings of nonreligious private
groups, it must make property equally available to religious groups).
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More than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court articulated its
view that the Establishment Clause precludes the federal
government from passing laws "which aid one religion, which
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'
At no time, however, have the courts indicated that statutes
that give special consideration to religious groups are per se
invalid.255 As the Court stated in Zorach v. Clauson:256
Government may not finance religious groups nor
undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and
sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one
or some religion on any person. But we find no
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight
against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence.257
The Supreme Court "has long recognized that the
government may (and sometimes must) accommodate
religious practices and that it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause." 58 Indeed, religious accommodations
are written into the United States Constitution,2 9 Congress has
enacted federal statutes accommodating religion,260 and state
legislatures have commonly provided exemptions to religious
254. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,15 (1947).
255. Although religious accommodations are permissible, numerous state
courts have held that a statutory exemption violates the Establishment Clause
when it singles out members of a "recognized" religion or a religious body. See
Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107,113 (Md. 1982) (holding that immunization exception
for members of "recognized" religion "contravenes... principle of governmental
neutrality regarding different religious beliefs."); Dali v. Board of Educ., 267
N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1971) (holding that a statute exempting from vaccination
requirements those objectors who subscribed to "tenets and practices of a
recognized church or religious denomination" violates First and Fourteenth
Amendments of United States Constitution and state constitution in extending
preferential treatment to members of some faiths while denying exemption to
others objecting to vaccination on religious grounds). As a drafting measure, state
legislatures should avoid using such restrictive language in their religious
freedom acts. Wisely, none of the state RFRAs that have passed constitutional
scrutiny limited their coverage to just "recognized" religions.
256. 343 U.S. 306 (1951).
257. Id. at 314.
258. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S. 136,144-45 (1987).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring all executive, judicial, and
legislative officers to support the Constitution "by Oath or Affirmation"). The
option of affirmation was added to accommodate adherents of minority faiths that
refused to take oaths for religious reasons.
260. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994) (allowing accommodation for religious apparel in
armed forces); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (1994) (assuring members of Native
American Church the ability to use peyote).
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objectors from neutral, generally applicable laws.26' In at least
four decisions, the Court has held that exempting religious
organizations from the sweep of neutral laws does not violate
the Constitution.
262
The leading authority supporting the allowance of religious
accommodation is the Supreme Court's decision in Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos. 26 In Amos, a gymnasium
employee brought suit against his religious employer after he
was discharged for failure to prove membership in the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.2 4 The Church defended its
conduct under § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
exempts religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition of
religious discrimination in employment.20 In upholding the
constitutionality of the exemption under the Establishment
Clause, the Court applied the well-known three-pronged test
for neutrality enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.266 Under Lemon,
in order to satisfy the Establishment Clause a statute: (1) must
have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) must not foster excessive entanglement with religion.267
261. See statutes cited, supra note 89.
262. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(allowing exemption from federal antidiscrinilnation laws for religious
organizations does not violate Establishment Clause); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that exemption from military draft for religious
conscientious objectors does not violate the Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that state property tax exemption for
religious organizations does not violate the Establishment Clause); Zorach, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (holding that student exemption from public school to attend daily
religious instruction does not violate the Establishment Clause).
263. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
264. See id. at 330.
265. See id. at 331.
266. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
267. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Although Lemon has never
been overruled, this test has been heavily criticized and ignored in later opinions,
leaving the future of the Lemon test uncertain. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736 (1976). Various members of the Court have proposed modifications
to the test and some have questioned the adequacy of the test to govern the entire
spectrum of Establishment Clause cases. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding that "a single test, a Grand
Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular
Clause" should not be the approach of the Court). Recently, in fact, the Court has
applied the Lemon test so that its third prong collapses into its second. Thus, it
appears that in the future, whether a statute produces excessive government
entanglement with religion will be part of the inquiry into its effect. See Agostini
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Noting that "it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate
significant governmental interference with the ability of
religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
missions," the Amos Court indicated that Lemon would prevent
religious accommodation only where the government itself
advances religion through its own activities and influence.268
As long as the "government acts with the proper purpose of
lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion," the
Court ruled, there is "no reason to require that the exemption
come packaged with benefits to secular entities."269
The Supreme Court has supported other laws of
accommodation under similar reasoning. In Zorach v.
Clauson,27° the Court upheld a statutory program that
authorized the release of public school children to attend
religious classes.2 1 Since the program was neither financed
through public funds nor held in public classrooms, the Court
found no impermissible fostering of religion on the part of the
school district.27 Rather, the Court emphasized that:
When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the
best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs.7-3
While it is true that religion may profit from exemption from
a neutral law of general applicability, the Court on numerous
occasions has confirmed that a law does not violate the
Establishment Clause merely because it has the net result of
benefiting religion.274 The Court has "consistently held that
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The Court will have the next opportunity to
announce the Establishment Clause test during its review of Helms v. Picard, 151
F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336
(1999); and Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999).
268. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
269. Id. at 338.
270. 343 U.S. 306 (1951).
271. See id.
272. See Id. at 308-09. Compare with Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating released time program where public classrooms
were turned over to religious instructors).
273. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14.
274. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv., 474
U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
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government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are
not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just
because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated
financial benefit."2'h In Everson v. Board of Education 76 the
Court approved the expenditure of tax-raised monies to pay for
the bus fares of parochial school children where the same
funding was being given to public school pupils, even though
the challenged regulation undoubtedly helped children get to
church schools. '  Likewise, in Board of Education v. Allen,27 the
Court permitted the state to loan secular textbooks to all
children in accredited schools despite the fact that free books
made it more likely that some children would choose to attend
a sectarian school.279 The Court emphasized that "no funds or
books [were] furnished to parochial schools," and that
therefore "the financial benefit [was] to parents and children,
not to schools."'28
Also, in Mueller v. Allen,281 the Court rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a law allowing taxpayers to
deduct certain educational expenses in computing state income
tax, even though a majority of the deductions went to parents
whose children attended sectarian schools. 2 2  Because the
provision applied to all parents and the public funds became
available to the religious institutions only as a result of the
private choices of the individual parents, the Court reasoned
this was not the type of direct transmission of assistance
forbidden under the Establishment Clause.3 Following
virtually identical reasoning, the Court allowed a blind person
U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946). Cf Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state may constitutionally supply nonpublic schools
with books, standardized tests, diagnostic, and remedial services but may not
provide funds for instructional material and equipment or field trips); Committee
For Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (state funds
for maintenance and repair and tuition reimbursement for sectarian schools
violates the Establishment Clause).
275. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8.
276. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
277. See id. at 17.
278. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
279. See id. at 244.
280. Id. at 243-44.
281. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
282. See id. at 401.
283. See id. at 399.
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to use a state grant to attend a Christian college, 284 and
mandated that a school district allow a sign-language
interpreter to accompany a deaf child to classes at a Catholic
high school.' As the reasoning of these cases suggest, a
regulation does not offend the Establishment Clause merely
because it benefits religion as long as the government aid
provided does not result in a direct and substantial
advancement of a sectarian enterprise. 2 6
While the Court has sustained various accommodations and
government aid programs, it never assessed whether RFRA
violated the Establishment Clause."7 At least four courts of
appeal, however, sustained the constitutionality of RFRA
under the Establishment Clause.288 In In re Young,2 9 a debtor's
284. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv., 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986). The
program, which provided vocational assistance directly to the student, was "in no
way skewed towards religion" and "create[d] no financial incentive for students
to undertake sectarian education." Id.
285. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993). The
service was "part of a general government program that distributes benefits
neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled" and was available in sectarian
schools "only as a result of the private decision of individual parents." Id.
286. The Supreme Court has struck down various programs that gave direct
grants of government aid, like instructional equipment and materials and
maintenance and repair subsidies, because the assistance relieved sectarian
schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating their students. See
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist; 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Interestingly, the Court recently overruled two direct aid cases in Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997), by allowing public school teachers into parochial schools to
provide remedial education to disadvantaged children. But see Board of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (refusing to uphold a law that created a special school
district contiguous with a religious community so that the village's handicapped
children could receive special education services by public employees). The
Agostini Court directly overruled the line of reasoning set out in Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985), and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985),
finding no evidence that placing full-time employees on parochial school
campuses had an impermissible effect of advancing religion through government
inculcation or financial incentives. The Court then reaffirmed its position in
Zobrest and Witters that such government assistance was not barred by the
Establishment Clause. The Court recently granted review in Mitchell v. Helms, 119
S. Ct. 2336 (1999) (No. 98-1648), to decide whether a program that provides funds
to state and local education agencies to purchase and lend neutral, secular
materials such as computers, software, and library books to public and nonpublic
schools, violates the Establishment Clause.
287. Justice Stevens has been the only Justice to suggest that RFRA is a "law
respecting an establishment of religion" that violates the First Amendment of the
Constitution. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part).
288. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Catholic
Univ., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996);
Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997).
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trustee appealed a federal court's decision denying her
recovery of religious tithes, contending that the enforcement of
RFRA violated the Establishment Clause.29° Applying Lemon,
the court found that RFRA (1) had a secular purpose, in that it
was enacted to protect freedom of religion and did not benefit a
particular religious sect, (2) did not advance or inhibit religion
by "only protect[ing] individuals from laws which
'substantially burden a person's exercise of religion,'" and (3)
sought to prevent, rather than foster, excessive government
entanglement with religion by limiting the impact of neutral
laws on religion.291 Under virtually identical reasoning, courts
have rejected Establishment Clause challenges to RFRA when
used to protect a murder suspect's confession to a priest from
disclosure29 2 and to obtain a building permit to enlarge a
church.293
There is no question that like RFRA, state religious freedom
acts constitute a substantial accommodation to religious
institutions and beliefs. The acts, however, do not cross the
boundary into an impermissible fostering of religion that is
forbidden under the Establishment Clause, but instead
maintain the benevolent neutrality that the Supreme Court
requires."
289. 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
290. See id. at 857.
291. Id. at 862-63. Under analogous facts and analysis, an Idaho court also held
that RFRA did not violate the Establishment Clause. See In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386
(D. Idaho 1998) (emphasizing "the weight of authority arrayed in support of the
proposition that RFRA does not violate the Establishment Clause"). But see In re
Saunders, 215 B.R. 800, 806 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that RFRA, as applied to
permit tithing in the context of a Chapter 13 plan, violated the Establishment
Clause because it favored religion over nonreligion and imposed "a necessity for
'continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement' into
the mind and soul of the debtor").
292. See Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1530.
293. See Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352,1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
294. For detailed arguments for and against the constitutionality of RFRA, see
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Do State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Violate the Establishment
Clause or Separation of Powers?, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1999); Thomas C. Berg,
The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation and Why They Are Wrong, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 433-43 (1999); Timothy L. Hall, Omnibus Protections of
Religious Liberty and the Establishment Clause, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 539 (1999); Jed
Rubendall, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitutional, 95
MICH. L. REV. 234 (1997); William Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Establishment, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227
(1995); Scott C. Idelman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of
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Beyond a certain outer limit, accommodation may become an
establishment of religion. When a purported accommodation
irrebuttably gives preferential treatment to religious
commitments without considering the cost to competing
secular concerns, the Court has been understandably uneasy.
In Thornton v. Caldor,295 the Supreme Court struck down a
statute giving all religious employees the absolute and
unqualified right not to work on their chosen Sabbath.296 The
Court found that the statute commanded that "Sabbath
religious concerns automatically control over all secular
interests at the workplace."2 Under the statute, the employer
could not refuse to accommodate the employee's Sabbath, even
where excusing him from working would impose substantial
economic burdens on the employer or cause hardship to other
employees who were required to work in the stead of the
Sabbath worshiper. Because of the "unyielding weighting in
favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests," 298 the Court
determined that the law crossed from constitutional neutrality
to unconstitutional favoritism.
Some commentators have grasped onto Thornton to argue
that all accommodation statutes would violate the
Establishment Clause because the acts undeniably privilege
religion over other interests in society.299 This reading of
Thornton, however, cannot be reconciled with the substantial
Establishment Clause jurisprudence allowing for such
accommodation."' Furthermore, unlike the statute the Court
struck down in Thornton, state religious freedom acts do not
confer an unlimited preference to religion over all competing
secular interests. Quite to the contrary, where the government
has a compelling interest that cannot be satisfied by
alternatives less restrictive of the religious practice in issue,
concerns of civil society trump the free exercise of religion. In
short, state religious freedom acts do not codify "absolute and
unqualified" rights of religious exercise that the Thornton Court
Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247,294 (1994).
295. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
296. Id. at 709.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 710.
299. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 294.
300. See supra notes 255-86 and accompanying text.
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found violative of the Establishment Clause. 1
The Court also has invalidated exemptions where the
government has directed a subsidy exclusively to religious
organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause.
In Texas Monthly v. Bullock,3°2  the Court declared
unconstitutional a statute that singled out for exemption from
state sales and use tax periodicals that consisted solely of
writings promulgating the teachings of a religious faith.0 3
Unlike state religious freedom acts, the tax exemption directly
"'provide[d] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious
organizations"' and "'convey[ed] a message of endorsement' to
slighted members of the community."3t 4 The Bullock Court
noted further, employing a Lemon-like analysis, that the
exemption lacked any secular objective "that would justify its
preference along with similar benefits for nonreligious
publications or groups" and produced a greater state
entanglement with religion than would the denial of an
exemption.05 Under these findings, the Court concluded that a
tax exemption that solely targeted religious writings was
clearly state sponsorship of religion and thus violated the
Establishment Clause.0 6
As these cases suggest, the Establishment Clause does not
301. In her concurring opinion in Thornton, Justice O'Connor further observed
that the Connecticut statute unconstitutionally singled out adherents to a
particular religious belief-observance of the Sabbath-for protection and thus
signaled government endorsement only of those who share in that belief. See
Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also noted
that the Sabbath law relieved burdens on religion imposed by private, rather than
governmental, employers and thus "is not the sort of accommodation statute
specifically contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 712.
302. 489 U.S. 1 (1988).
303. See id. at 5.
304. Id. at 17 (citing Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
305. Id.
306. See id. Cf Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Walz Court
upheld a property tax exemption that applied equally to religious properties and
real estate owned by a wide array of other nonprofit organizations, despite the
sizable tax savings it accorded religious groups. The breadth of the tax exemption
in the Walz case was essential to the Court's holding that it was not aimed at
establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion, but rather possessed the
legitimate secular purpose and effect of contributing to the community's cultural,
intellectual, and moral betterment. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 673. Additionally, the
Court found no "sponsorship" or "genuine nexus" between the tax exemption
and establishment of religion, because the exemption "restrict[ed] the fiscal
relationship between church and state, and tend[ed] to complement and reinforce
the desired separation insulating each from the other." Id. at 676.
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bar accommodation unless government inalterably exempts
religious objectors regardless of the impact on secular interests
or supplies direct affirmative assistance to a religious
organization or institution. While state religious freedom acts
do not on their face transcend these limits, as a drafting
precaution, state legislatures should make clear that they do
not intend to exceed the bounds of the Establishment Clause in
enabling religious persons or organizations to claim
exemptions from generally applicable laws. When it enacted
RFRA, Congress included the following safety net:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret,
or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment
prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion
(referred to in this section as the "Establishment Clause").
Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to
the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall
not constitute a violation of this chapter.307
Many state religious freedom acts have properly expanded
this language to make clear that the act not only is subordinate
to the Establishment Clause limits of the United States
Constitution, but also is not meant to trump separation of
church and state provisions of the applicable state
constitution.0 8
In sum, the constitutional problems that impelled the
Supreme Court to void RFRA do not inhere in state religious
freedom acts. To avoid injecting constitutional faults into state
religious liberty acts, the legislature should: 1) affirmatively
proclaim that the state is relying upon its police power to
protect religious freedom as a matter of state statutory law and
is not tampering with the Free Exercise guarantees of the
United States Constitution; 2) refrain from characterizing the
act as one "restoring" religious liberty; 3) abnegate reference to
pre-Smith decisions of the United States Supreme Court;
4) declare that the legislation does not purport to affect or
interpret wholly independent and separate rights of religious
307. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-4 (1994). The
House of Representatives mirrored this language when it approved the Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691,106th Cong. § 6.
308. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(e) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 761.05(5) (West 1999); H.B. 2370, § 25(c), 89th Reg. Sess. (II1. 1997); H.B. 3158, § 1-
32-60(c)(2) (S.C. 1999); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.009(b) (West
1999).
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liberty guaranteed by the state constitution; and 5) state that
the act should not be construed to permit exemptions in
circumstances that would violate the Establishment Clause of
the United States Constitution or any state constitutional
counterpart. While these drafting precautions should suffice to
vanquish constitutional challenges, in order that the acts fulfill
their true promise, state religious freedom statutes must go
further to address a variety of issues relating to the civil action
necessary to vindicate religious liberty.
D. State Religious Freedom Acts Should Prescribe the Elements of
the Prima Facie Case, Defenses, and Remedies Applicable to the
Civil Cause ofAction
Apart from the previously analyzed constitutional and
drafting considerations, state religious liberty acts must resolve
several issues relating to the civil cause of action that will be
utilized to affirmatively assert rights under the statute. Most of
the state religious liberty acts parrot the very general remedial
language that Congress adopted when it enacted RFRA. 09 In
the section entitled "Judicial Relief," RFRA provides that "A
person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation
of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in
a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.""1 The only other provision concerning the civil
cause of action to enforce RFRA is Section 4 of the Act, which
amends the Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 to authorize an
award of reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff who prevails
in an action to enforce rights created by RFRA.an
By providing a "claim in a judicial proceeding" for
"appropriate relief," RFRA and its state clones fail to answer
several critical questions that arise when parties whose
309. See S.B. 1391, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. § 41-1493.01(D) (Ariz. 1999); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03(2) (West 1999); A.B. 1617,1997-
98 Regular Session, § 6402(d) (Cal. 1998) (vetoed); H.B. 2370, 89th Reg. Leg. Sess.
§ 20 (i1. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-50 (S.C. 1999); S.B. 1394, 55th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Idaho 2000).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (1994). The House of Representatives' proposed
federal RLPA similarly prescribes the cause of action in general terms, providing
that "[a] person may assert a violation of this Act as a claim or defense in a judicial
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government." H.R. 1691, § 4(a).
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). The proposed federal RLPA likewise amends
42 U.S.C. § 1988 to include RLPA among the list of civil statutes under which the
prevailing plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees. See H.R. 1691, § 4(b).
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religious exercise has been burdened lodge a civil action
against an individual official or governmental entity. The
generic language does not resolve what standard of culpability
the plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case and
whether, as a defense, individual officials sued under the act
may assert absolute or qualified immunity. The language is
equally unhelpful in determining whether a state or local
governmental entity may be held vicariously liable for
violations of the religious freedom act by governmental
employees acting in the scope of their employment or whether
the entity may assert any immunity from liability. Finally, the
text does not resolve whether punitive damages are embraced
within the "appropriate relief" recoverable against the named
individual or entity defendant.
All of these issues regarding the prima facie case, defenses,
and remedies have arisen when persons filed civil actions to
redress violations of rights protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Like RFRA, the Constitution does not
specify the elements of the prima facie case, defenses, and
remedies governing a civil action brought to enforce its
guarantees. However, plaintiffs may obtain relief for
deprivations of their constitutional rights at the hands of state
actors by filing an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 312
While the language of § 1983 is equally general as RFRA and
its state analogs, a body of judicial decisions interpreting § 1983
has largely settled the elements of the cause of action, defenses
and available remedies. It is now clear that a state or local
official sued under § 1983 may be held individually liable for
violations of the Constitution, even where his conduct also
312. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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contravenes state and local law. 3 To establish a prima facie
case under § 1983, the plaintiff does not have to prove any
additional culpability beyond violation of the Constitution,"4
although the plaintiff may need to prove a level of culpability
to establish a deprivation of the particular constitutional right
allegedly invaded.1 5 However, the individual state or local
official may raise an immunity defense. 16 Whether the
immunity is absolute or qualified depends upon the function
that the official performs. Government employees who are
executing legislative,317  judicial,3 1 8  and prosecutorial 319
313. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
314. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981).
315. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,140 n.1 (1979) ("[Tlhe state of mind of
the defendant may be relevant on the issue of whether a constitutional violation
has occurred in the first place, quite apart from the issue of whether § 1983
contains some additional qualification of that nature before a defendant may be
held to respond in damages."); Daniels, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that negligent
conduct does not constitute a "deprivation" within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (holding that only
purposeful discrimination violated Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1977) (holding the proof of
negligence in administering medical care to a prisoner insufficient to state a claim
for violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the prisoner must demonstrate
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.").
316. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
317. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (holding local legislators
absolutely immune for legislative activities); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'1 Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,402-06 (1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1954) (holding that state and regional legislators are absolutely immune for
legislative acts, whether the relief sought is legal or equitable); see also Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the US., 446 U.S. 719, 731-32 (1980)
(holding judges immune when performing legislative functions).
318. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam) (holding judge
absolutely immune for ordering police to use excessive force to bring defense
counsel to courtroom); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1978) (holding
judges absolutely immune for ordering sterilization of unrepresented minor);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (holding judge was absolutely immune for
adjudicating Freedom Riders guilty under unconstitutional law). While
absolutely immune from suit for all judicial acts within their jurisdiction, absolute
immunity may be denied where judges act in a non-judicial capacity. See
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (holding no absolute immunity for
discriminatory dismissal of probation officer taken in judge's administrative
capacity); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719
(1980) (holding Virginia Supreme Court not absolutely immune from initiation of
disciplinary proceedings taken in court's enforcement capacity).
The Supreme Court held that although absolute immunity extends to suits for
damages, it does not shield judges from actions for equitable relief. See Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Congress later amended § 1983 to provide "that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for any act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C.
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functions are absolutely immune from suit. All other officials
engaged in discretionary functions are generously shielded by
qualified immunity.32 Qualified immunity exonerates the
officer from damages321 whenever a) the constitutional right
violated was not clearly established, or b) the official did not
know and should not have known of the right, or c) the official
did not know and should not have known that her actions
contravened the right.322  If found liable, however, the
individual officer may be held to pay compensatory damages
for any actual harm the plaintiff proves that was suffered 3' as
well as punitive damages where the officer is found to have
acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's constitutional
§ 1983 (1994).
Court reporters may not avail themselves of absolute judicial immunity. See
Antoine v. Byers, 508 U.S. 429 (1993). On the other hand, police officers are
absolutely immune from § 1983 liability founded upon their allegedly perjured
testimony in judicial proceedings. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). But
see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (holding that police officers are not
absolutely immune for causing an unconstitutional arrest by presenting judge
with affidavit that fails to establish probable cause).
319. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Absolute prosecutorial
immunity is limited to suits for damages and does not bar § 1983 actions seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief. See Supreme Court of Virginia, 446 U.S. at 736-37.
Prosecutorial immunity extends to the prosecutor's role as an advocate but does
not protect prosecutors in some other situations. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478
(1991) (holding that prosecutorial immunity does not shield prosecutors from
liability stemming from legal advice given to police officers); Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding that prosecutors may be liable for
fabricating evidence later presented to the grand jury and for making false
statements at a press conference); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (holding
that prosecutors may be liable for including untrue information in a certification
for determination of probable cause).
320. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (police officers); Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governors
and other state executive officers); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police
officers). But see Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (holding that private
prison guards are not entitled to assert qualified immunity); Wyatt v. Cole, 504
U.S. 158 (1992) (denying qualified immunity defense to private business partner
and his attorney); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (holding that public
defenders have no immunity under § 1983).
321. Qualified immunity may not be asserted in actions for equitable relief. See
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,314 n.6 (1975).
322. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617-18; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Before 1982, qualified immunity was
denied to officials who acted "with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury." See Wood, 420 U.S. at 322. In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), however, the Court abrogated the subjective prong
of the immunity defense.
323. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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right.324
The rules governing entity liability under § 1983 differ
depending on whether the defendant is an arm of the local or
state government. Under § 1983, state governmental entities
may be sued for prospective equitable relief;3' however,
because Congress did not expressly abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity32 6 from suit in federal court,
states who violate the Constitution may not be required to pay
damages for the harms caused by their unconstitutional
actions.327 Local governmental entities, on the other hand, are
not sheltered by the Eleventh Amendment and thus may be
sued for both compensatory damages329 and equitable relief
should they invade liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, a plaintiff may not recover against a municipality
simply by proving that one of its employees violated
constitutional norms while acting in the scope of employment;
instead, a plaintiff must further prove that the violation was
visited pursuant to the governmental entity's policy or
custom.33  If the plaintiff has proven the prima facie case, the
local governmental entity may not assert the absolute or
qualified immunity of its employee as a defense to damages.331
324. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
325. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Ex pare Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)., To secure prospective relief against a
state entity without contravening the Eleventh Amendment, however, the. suit
must not name the entity as a defendant but instead be filed against a state officer
in his official, as opposed to individual, capacity. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781 (1978) (per curiam).
326. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a
suit filed in federal court against a state by its own citizen.
327. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1979). Victims of constitutional wrongs may not recover damages against state
entities by bringing their action in state court. While this tactic avoids the bar. of
the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court held that states are not "persons"
within the meaning of § 1983 and thus are not amenable to suit. See Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
328. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978).
329. Local governmental entities are not liable for punitive damages. See
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
330. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112
(1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
331. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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In construing the contours of the civil action authorized by
RFRA, the lower federal courts explicitly or implicitly relied
upon § 1983 doctrine. Governmental officials sued for violation
of RFRA were permitted to assert the same absolute332 and
qualified 333 immunity defenses available in § 1983 actions.
Local governmental entities were shielded from liability absent
proof of governmental custom or policy.' 34 State governmental
entities remained immune from actions for damages.335
The borrowing of § 1983 case law for actions for violation of
RFRA may be well-founded. By its terms, § 1983 not only
authorizes a civil action for deprivations of rights protected by
the Federal Constitution, but also may be invoked to redress
violation of rights enshrined in federal statutes.336 In many
cases, litigants seeking to take advantage of the enhanced
protection of religious liberty created by RFRA brought their
action for violation of RFRA under § 1983.337 In such instances,
the courts were on sound footing in looking to settled § 1983
doctrine in ascertaining the elements, defenses and remedies
available in the cause of action.338
332. See Abordo v. State of Hawaii, 902 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Haw. 1995).
333. See Craddick v. Duckworth, 113 F.3d 83, 85 (7th Cir. 1997); Werner v.
McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1481-82 (10th Cir. 1995); Show v. Patterson, 955 F. Supp.
182, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Tinsley v. Pittari, 952 F. Supp. 384, 389-92 (N.D. Tex.
1996); Jones-Bey v. Wright, 944 F. Supp. 723, 739 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Harless v. Darr,
937 F. Supp. 1339, 1351 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Gilmore-Bey v. Coughlin, 929 F. Supp.
146, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1116 (E.D. Wis.
1996); Abordo, 902 F. Supp. at 1229; Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
334. See Harless, 937 F. Supp. at 1347-49; Abordo, 902 F. Supp. at 1228 n.6.
335. See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v. New York, 954 F. Supp. 65
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); Gilmore-Bey, 929 F. Supp. at 149-50; Abordo, 902 F. Supp. at 1228;
Rust v. Clarke, 851 F. Supp. 377,380-81 (D. Neb. 1994).
336. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5 (1980). However, a plaintiff will not
be allowed to redress a statutory violation by suing under § 1983 if "(1) 'the
statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the
meaning of § 1983,' or (2) 'Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute
in the enactment itself." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990)
(alteration in original) (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987).
337. See Williams v. Norris, 176 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 1999); Craddick, 113 F.3d 83;
Jones-Bey, 944 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Abordo, 902 F. Supp. at 1223; Muslim,
897 F. Supp. 215.
338. In other instances, the plaintiffs did not expressly rely upon § 1983 as the
basis of the civil action but instead brought their civil claim directly under RFRA.
See Show, 955 F. Supp. 182; Gilmore-Bey, 929 F. Supp. 146. In these cases, the courts
never explained their rationale for borrowing standards of liability and defenses
from § 1983 for purposes of RFRA. It is arguable that Congress did not intend to
incorporate the rules governing an 1871 statute when it enacted RFRA well over a
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While § 1983 may be employed to redress violations of
federal statutes, the Act does not provide a cause of action
against state and local officials and entities that violate state
statutes.339  Thus, absent a general state civil rights act
analogous to § 1983, courts adjudicating claims under state
religious liberty statutes will not have at their disposal a body
of law that identifies the elements of the prima facie case,
defenses, and available remedies in a civil action to enforce the
rights created by the state religious liberty act. Rather, the
courts will be left only with the text of the religious liberty act
to inform the civil action. Hence, it is imperative that state
legislatures interested in exerting their constitutional authority
to protect religious liberty of minority faiths against burdens
imposed by neutral laws of general applicability go beyond the
general remedial language of RFRA and detail the contours of
the civil cause of action to enforce the statutory right.3M
century later. See Gary S. Gildin, Dis-Qualified Immunity for Discrimination Against
the Disabled, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 897.
339. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
340. Three of the state religious freedom acts venture beyond the generic
language of RFRA to offer guidance as to the elements of the claim, defenses, and
remedies. The Rhode Island Religious Freedom Restoration Act specifies that in a
civil action under the Act, "the court may (1) Afford injunctive and declaratory
relief against any governmental authority which proposes to commit a violation of
this chapter; and (2) Award a prevailing plaintiff damages." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-
80.1-4 (1993). This language does not clarify whether entity defendants may be
held vicariously liable nor does the legislation specify what immunities may be
asserted by individual officers or entities sued under the Act. Furthermore, the
Act does not mention whether punitive damages and attorney's fees are
recoverable by the prevailing plaintiff. The vetoed New Mexico Religious
Freedom Restoration Act utilizes similar threshold language but includes
provisions waiving entity and individual immunity and authorizing recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees. See S.B. 644, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. § 4 (N.M. 1999)
(vetoed). The cause of action for damages and waiver of immunity, however, is
limited by provisions of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act a) permitting a
governmental entity and public employee to assert any defense available under
New Mexico Law, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-14 (Michie 1996); b) capping the
amount of actual damages recoverable, § 41-4-19(A) (Michie 1996); and c) barring
recovery of exemplary damages, 8 41-4-19() (Michie 1996). The Texas act makes
the entity the exclusive defendant and waives sovereign immunity. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 88 110.005(d) and 110.008(a) (West 1999). The act
authorizes an award of reasonable attorney's fees, limits compensatory damages
to $10,000 for each controversy, regardless of the number of religious adherents
injured, and precludes recovery of punitive damages. See id. §§ 100.005
(a)(3)-(4), (b). No civil action for damages may be brought unless the aggrieved
party gives notice of the alleged violation of the Act and the government agency
has not alleviated the burden on religion within sixty days. See id. § 110.006.
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V. CONCLUSION
In his 1785 "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments" in Virginia, reprinted as an appendix to Justice
Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education,341
James Madison wrote:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to
him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree
of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.... [In matters of
religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society, and that religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance.
Because if religion be exempt from the authority of the
Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the
Legislative Body. 'The latter are but the creatures and
vicegerents of the former. M
2
The United States Supreme Court has looked to the Virginia
experience with religious freedom as "particularly relevant in
the search for the First Amendment's meaning." 43 Consistent
with Madison's weighting of competing demands of religion
and civil society, the Court's pre-Smith decisions required that
government prove a compelling interest and no alternatives
less restrictive of religion before upholding a burden on
religious exercise. In Smith, however, the Court reversed the
ranking, subjugating minority faiths to the wishes of civil
society whenever expressed, in neutral rules of general
applicability.
The Court has thwarted federal legislative efforts to restore
the eroded protection of religious liberty. Properly drafted,
state religious freedom non-restoration acts offer Virginia and
every other state the realization of Madison's vision of the
primacy of the individual's relation to his or her Creator.
341. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
.342. Id. at 64-65.
343. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437 (1961); see also Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973).
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